Empirical Analysis of Censorship Resistance Systems by unknown










First of all, praise be to Allah, who gave me all the blessing to complete this
work. Even with many challenges through the way, your grace gave me the
strength to finish my thesis.
Nothing could be done without the support, prayers, and the passion of my
parents thank you all from the bottom of my heart.
My gratitude and appreciation to all my brothers and sisters who supported me
with every possible way to finish my studies, Thank you all.
My sincerest gratitude is extended to my mentor and advisor Dr.Sami Zhioua.
Thank you for all the knowledge you gave, your patience and your guidance




LIST OF TABLES viii
LIST OF FIGURES ix
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS xi
ABSTRACT (ENGLISH) xiii
ABSTRACT (ARABIC) xv
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Thesis Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Organization of the Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
CHAPTER 2 CENSORSHIP 9
2.1 Censor Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.1.1 Household Censor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.1.2 Corporation Censor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.1.3 Service Provider Censor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.1.4 Government Censor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2 Censor Capabilities and Attacking Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2.1 Traffic Flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
iv
2.2.2 Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2.3 Clients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2.4 People . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2.5 Network Based Views . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2.6 Censorship Resistance System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3 Censor Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3.1 Technical Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3.2 Sphere of Influence Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3.3 False Positives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3.4 False Negatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.4 Tor and Censorship : Case Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.4.1 Tor and The Great Firewall of China . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.5 Internet Filtering in Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.5.1 Internet Infrastructure in Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.5.2 Content Filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
CHAPTER 3 CENSORSHIP RESISTANCE SYSTEMS 29
3.1 CRS Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.1.1 Resistance Strategies CORDON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.1.2 CRS Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.2 CRS Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.2.1 Tor and Tor Subsystems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.2.2 Stand alone Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
CHAPTER 4 WEBSITE FINGERPRINTING 61
4.1 Website Fingerprinting Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.1.1 OSAD Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.1.2 kNN attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.2 Website Fingerprinting Defenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.2.1 Traffic morphing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.2.2 HTTPOS split . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
v
4.2.3 Decoy pages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.2.4 BuFLO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.2.5 Tamaraw . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
CHAPTER 5 ENVIRONMENT SETUP AND DATA COLLEC-
TION 73
5.1 CRS Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
5.2 Environment Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.3 Data Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
5.4 Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
CHAPTER 6 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF TRAFFIC PATTERNS 82
6.1 Statistical Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
6.1.1 Total Number of Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
6.1.2 Total Number of Incoming and Outgoing Packets . . . . . 86
6.1.3 Average Packet Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
6.1.4 Time Overhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
6.1.5 Data Overhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
6.1.6 Unique Packet Lengths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
6.1.7 Experiment Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
6.2 HTTP Archive Format Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
6.2.1 Browsers and Webpage Objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
6.2.2 Experiment Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
6.2.3 Experment Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
CHAPTER 7 RESISTANCE TO WEBSITE FINGERPRINTING
ATTACKS 104
7.1 Wa-kNN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
7.1.1 Wa-kNN using Cells . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
7.1.2 Wa-kNN using Time and Packet Size . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
7.1.3 Wa-kNN using Packet Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
vi
7.2 Wa-OSAD and Cai-OSAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
7.2.1 Wa-OSAD using Rounded Packet Size . . . . . . . . . . . 112
7.2.2 Cai-OSAD using Rounded Packet Size . . . . . . . . . . . 114
7.3 Number of Samples versus Accuracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
7.4 Experiment Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 119
8.1 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
8.2 Threats to Validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123






2.1 The percentage of banned sites types in local list . . . . . . . . . 27
5.1 The selected CRS on our research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
5.2 The collected samples with different setups . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
6.1 Statistical Analysis Summary, (RND) for Randomization, (PRGM)
for Programmable and (DR) for Decoy Routing . . . . . . . . . . 97
6.2 Statistical Analysis Summary for defenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
7.1 The resistance to website fingerprinting, summary of all CRS, (RND)
for Randomization, (PRGM) for Programmable and (DR) for De-
coy Routing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
7.2 The resistance to website fingerprinting, summary of defenses . . 118
viii
LIST OF FIGURES
2.1 Users and Internet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2 Censor Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3 Summary of censor capabilities and attacking techniques . . . . . 14
2.4 Summary of censor limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.5 Timeline of Tor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.6 Internet infrastructure in Saudi Arabia from 1997 until 2004 . . . 25
2.7 Internet infrastructure in Saudi Arabia in 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.8 The blocked page when trying to open pornographic site . . . . . 27
2.9 The blocked page when trying to open the famous torrent site thep-
iratebay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.1 Summary of CORDON taxonomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.2 CRS Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.3 Tor Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.4 Tor and Pluggable Transport Bridges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.5 HTTP pipelining and randomized requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.6 Tor Pluggable Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.7 Tor Pluggable Transport obfs2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.8 Tor Pluggable Transport obfs3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.9 Tor Pluggable Transport obfs4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.10 Tor Pluggable Transport ScrambleSuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.11 Tor Pluggable Transport meek . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.12 Tor Pluggable Transport FTE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
ix
3.13 JAP System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.14 YourFreedom CRS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.1 Limited WF defenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.2 General WF defenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
6.1 The average and the standard deviation of the total number of packets 84
6.2 Percentage-of change in the total number of packets . . . . . . . . 84
6.3 Percentage of change in total number of Incoming packets . . . . 87
6.4 Percentage of change in total number of outgoing packets . . . . . 88
6.5 The average and the standard deviation of packet size . . . . . . . 88
6.6 Percentage of change of the average packet size . . . . . . . . . . 88
6.7 The average and the standard deviation of time overhead . . . . . 90
6.8 Percentage of change in Time overhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
6.9 The average and the standard deviation of the data overhead . . . 94
6.10 Percentage of change in data overhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
6.11 Percentage of change in Incoming unique packet lengths . . . . . . 95
6.12 Percentage of change in outgoing unique packet lengths . . . . . . 96
6.13 Fetching Wikipedia.org using different CRSs . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
6.14 Tor and Tor PT with FireFox versus Tor Browser Bundle . . . . . 100
7.1 kNN attack and defenses on cell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
7.2 kNN attack and defenses on traces as time and packet size . . . . 108
7.3 kNN attack and defenses on traces as packet size . . . . . . . . . 110
7.4 Wa-OSAD attacks and defenses on traces as rounded packet size . 113
7.5 Cai-OSAD attacks and defenses on traces as rounded packet size . 114
7.6 the accuracy of Wa-kNN attack versus number of samples . . . . 116
7.7 Cai-OSAD attacks on traces as rounded packet size with 10 websites
15 traces for each . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
x
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AES The Advanced Encryption Standard
BuFLO Buffered Fixed-Length Obfuscator
CGI Common Gateway Interface
CRS Censorship Resistance Systems
CSS Cascading Style Sheets
DNS Domain Name System
DPI Deep Packet Inspection
ESR Extended Support Release
FF FireFox
FTE Format-Transforming Encryption
FTP File Transfer Protocol
HAR HTTP Archive format
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTTPOS HTTP Obfuscation
HTTPS Hyper Text Transfer Protocol Secure
ISP Internet Service Provider
JAP Java Anon Proxy





OFB The Output Feedback mode
OSAD Optimal String Alignment Distance
RSA Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (cryptosystem)
SNI Server Name Indication
SOCKS Socket Secure
SSH Secure Shell
SVM Support Vector Machine
TBB Tor Browser Bundle
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TLS Transport Layer Security
Tor The Onion Router
Tor-PT Tor Pluggable Transport
UDP User Datagram Protocol
WF Website Fingerprinting
WLLCC Weight Learning by Locally Collapsing Classes
XML eXtensible Markup Language
xii
THESIS ABSTRACT
NAME: Abdullah Bin Ayedh AlQahtani
TITLE OF STUDY: Empirical Analysis of Censorship Resistance Systems
MAJOR FIELD: Security and Information Assurance
DATE OF DEGREE: JANUARY 2018
One of the most important features that characterize the Internet is freedom.
However, the Internet is still censored almost everywhere by people, companies or
particularly governments. There are many reasons to apply Internet censorship
some of which are political, religious or moral reasons. In contrast, individuals
are using censorship resistance systems (CRS) to access the banned sites in their
countries. The arms race reached high levels between Internet users and censorship
systems. This lead to more improvements on both sides in a way achieves both
contradictory goals. In this thesis, we empirically study well-known censorship
resistance systems (CRS). We conducted more than 300 experiments related to
traffic analysis including statistical analysis, HTTP Archive format (HAR) anal-
ysis and Website fingerprinting attacks. To the best of our knowledge, no previous
work did such an exhaustive empirical analysis. The detailed analysis allowed us
xiii
to reveal surprising results and draw very interesting conclusions in this crucial
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Sharing information and latest news using the Internet takes only a few seconds.
Furthermore, the freedom of the Internet made it easy for anyone to publish what
he or she desires. In contrast, some may think that a free Internet will make it a
place to share information that might not suit everyone. For example, publishing
information that may threaten national security, exposing children to inappro-
priate contents, or even a child using the Internet at a time prohibited by the
parents. Hence, the concept of Internet censorship began as a big brother who
will make the Internet suitable for everyone under his protection.
On the other hand, some Internet users consider such control as suppression
of freedom or privacy violation. Such users are interested in keeping the Internet
as free as possible to share information, ideas or even scandals. Moreover, they
want to protect their Internet activities from any monitoring attempts. In some
countries, those monitoring operations could be the beginning of series of events
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that will lead to imprisonment or death.
As a result of that, each side of the story will develop the tools and means to
achieve its objectives. The censorship will start to use the techniques that will
keep any published contents under its control. On the contrary, the anti-censorship
group will seek to defeat this concept to achieve its goal of a free Internet. In the
middle of this arms race, many remarkable techniques produced that are worthy
of study and research.
Censorship will start to apply some statistical analysis of traffic patterns gen-
erated by censorship resistance systems. This kind of traffic analysis will help
censorship to see the effects and the changes that occur in the traffic after using
such systems. Moreover, censorship can apply a specific type of fingerprinting
attacks which is website fingerprinting attacks. In this attack, the censorship will
try to identify the website visited by the user while using any CRS. This type
of attack depends on machine learning and the traffic analysis of the encrypted
traffic.
In this work, we studied censorship and censorship resistance systems to see
the techniques and strategies used by each party to achieve the goals. Further-
more, we did an exhaustive empirical analysis of each censorship resistance system
using statistical analysis of traffic patterns and website fingerprinting attacks.
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In this chapter, we introduce the motivation to conduct this research. After
that, we mention our contributions that are related to the analysis of censorship
resistance systems (CRS). Finally, we dedicate a section about how the thesis
organized.
1.1 Motivation
Internet users around the world use censorship resistance systems to preserve their
privacy from any monitoring attempts by censorship. As an illustration, Tor [1]
is considered one of the most popular programs used to maintain privacy and
bypass censorship. According to statistics from Tor Metrics [2], the estimated
number of Tor users are around two million users between August and September
2017. These statistics, indicate that a large number of Internet users around the
world want to maintain their privacy while surfing the Internet. There are also
many successful attempts to limit the access to Tor network in countries such as
China. Citizens of such countries are unable to maintain their privacy or accessing
blocked sites.
There are numerous recent researches regarding censorship since its an impor-
tant topic. Each one of them focused on some field such as censorship classifica-
tion, the method of attacks or the nature of how they work. Other researchers
are interested in developing new systems that will try to circumvent censorship.
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The main motivation of this research is the sophisticated techniques of both
parties that are significantly evolving over a short period. Moreover, most studies
concentrated on the theoretical aspects, especially in censorship resistance sys-
tems. In this research, we focused on the empirical analysis aspect by deploying
and studying each one of the selected systems. In addition to that, our goal is to
complete the full picture and study three major topics which are censorship, cen-
sorship resistance systems and website fingerprinting attacks and defenses. During
all this research, we stand on the neutrality between the parties and study them
individually and practically.
1.2 Thesis Contributions
• Real world examples of censorship techniques and implementations:
We linked the theoretical part with real-world example of censorship and Tor
system to complete the picture. We dedicate a section to discuss the Internet
filtering in Saudi Arabia along with the organizations and regulations that or-
ganize its work.
• Empirical comparison of censorship resistance systems: We focused on
our research to target the well-known censorship resistance systems. Tor, Tor
pluggable transports, JAP and YourFreedom are well-known and currently ac-
tive systems. We did an exhaustive empirical analysis of the selected systems
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to compare between them using different setups.
• The largest set of different censorship resistance systems classes cov-
ered in one research : We targeted a set of published censorship resistance
systems, and we selected eight of them. Other systems excluded due to techni-
cal issues or lack of support from the developers.
• The largest collection of datasets for various censorship resistance
systems: We build a diversified and updated data sets of the selected systems.
In our research, we collected 12 different types of data sets as 48000 files of
network traces.
• Exhaustive statistical analysis on censorship resistance systems and
website fingerprinting defenses: We conducted around 576 experiments to
see how those systems change the normal traffic. To process such big set of
files, we developed our tools to automate such process.
• The impact of the browser type on traffic generated by different cen-
sorship resistance systems: We conduct HTTP Archive (HAR) analysis
using different browsers with different CRS. This experiment illustrate the ef-
fect of using different browsers with each censorship resistance systems.
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• Comparison of censorship resistance systems and different defenses
regarding website fingerprinting resistance : We apply three website fin-
gerprinting attacks and five defenses on the collected samples. Our results are
based on 321 experiments using 1284000 files that are extracted and processed
from the network traces mentioned before.
• Visual demonstrations of complex and important topics in details :
We worked hard in this research to design and represent a visual explanation by
illustrating each important concept in figures. This technique is very important
for the reader to understand the concept quickly.
1.3 Organization of the Thesis
In this thesis, we cover three main topics in the first three chapters which are
censorship, censorship resistance systems and website fingerprinting. In the last
three chapters, we discuss each type of experiment and the outcome results. In
chapter 4, we explain the experiments setups along with the challenges we faced.
In chapter 5, we discuss the statistical analysis of traffic patterns. In chapter 6,
we discuss the resistance to website fingerprinting attacks for each of the selected
CRS and defenses.
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In chapter 2, we start with an overview of censorship systems in general. We
explain the classification of censors to see the different types of censorship. We go
more in-depth to see that each censor has capabilities and attacking techniques
to impose its control. After that, we mention the censor limitations to see what
the censor can and can’t do. We dedicate a section for a case study of real-life
example between Tor and censorship. At the end of that chapter, we describe the
Internet filtering system in Saudi Arabia.
In chapter 3, we start with an overview of censorship resistance techniques
in general to see the different classes used. We explain that censorship resistance
systems strategies could fall into one or more of six strategies known as CORDON
taxonomy. After that, we discuss different examples of censorship resistance sys-
tems (CRS) that are active and running nowadays. We explain how each selected
CRS succeed to bypass the censorship.
In chapter 4, we mention a specific type of attack used on encrypted traffic
which is fingerprinting attack, mainly website fingerprinting attack. We mention
different types of attacks, and different type of defenses that resist those attacks.
In the chapters 6 and 7, we discuss the results of more than 800 experiments
conducted in this research. The experiments are divided into two major classes
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which are the statistical analysis of traffic patterns and the resistance to website
fingerprinting attacks. In the first class of experiments, we show how we con-
duct the statistical analysis and HTTP archive format (HAR) analysis along with
the results. In the second class of experiments, we show the impact of website




One of the most important features that characterize the Internet is freedom,
and the Internet was born free. However, the Internet is still censored almost
everywhere by people, companies and particularly governments. There are many
reasons to apply Internet censorship some of which are political, religious or moral
reasons. On the other hand, Internet censorship could be justified for other rea-
sons such as solving crimes that could threaten the national security or to increase
the efficiency of the system. On the other hand, Internet users will consider this
act as a violation of their privacy. For more clarification, there are two concepts
related to monitoring Internet users and their activities which are Censorship and
Surveillance.
Censorship is the process of observing communications, deleting or blocking
harmful contents based on political, economical or social point of view. Censorship
could involve blocking websites, arresting or harassing people who published those
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Figure 2.1: Users and Internet
harmful contents. Surveillance is defined as the close observation of an individual
or group that may have been involved in subversive or terrorist activities. Law
enforcement needs Internet surveillance to prevent terrorists or criminals from
using the Internet in malicious activities [3]. Censorship is often associated with
dictatorship and repressive governments in an attempt to stop certain activities.
On the other side, surveillance is considered as an important aspect in democratic
countries [4].
Both censorship and surveillance could interfere with the user’s privacy. Pri-
vacy is defined as the right to left alone without having others to collect informa-
tion about you. Privacy is a legitimate right for each individual unless it starts
to harm others. To maintain the privacy of Internet users, information security
community starts to develop solutions to circumvent censorship systems called
Censorship Resistance Systems or anti-Censorship systems. At that point, the
arms race began between the two parties each party will try to beat the other
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using new techniques in various ways.
2.1 Censor Classification
There are several motivations to carry out censorship based on the censor’s goal
and capabilities. For example, parents would like to prevent their children from ac-
cessing immoral contents. Companies would like to prevent access to the contents
that will reduce staff’s productivity or efficiency of the systems. Governments
may limit the freedom of speech regarding topics that could embarrass it in front
of the world. In general, we can classify the motivation of censorship to social,
economic or political reasons.
Each censor has a sphere of influence where it can impose its control on it.
Censors can control the access to contents that are located outside the sphere of
influence, but it cannot control the content publication. For example, parents can
control the access to immoral contents, but they cannot remove those contents
from the Internet. Similarly, governments can block citizens from accessing oppo-
sition contents, but those contents are published outside the sphere of influence.
In addition to that, each censor has technical capabilities that vary based on its
goal. Governments are known to have powerful and sophisticated types of equip-
ment to observe Internet infrastructure within its sphere of influence.
Elahi and Goldberg al. [5] categorized censors by their motivation, sphere of
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Figure 2.2: Censor Classification
influence, and technical capabilities. There are four major censorship categories
which are household, corporation, service provider, and government.
2.1.1 Household Censor
This censor is motivated by social and moral reasons to limit the access to inap-
propriate contents on the Internet. Often it is managed by parents to control the
content that their children watch. This Censor has simple technical capabilities
inside a limited sphere of influence. Usually, its located inside the home Internet
router to control the contents accessed by any users in that network.
2.1.2 Corporation Censor
This censor has several motivations related to productivity, efficiency, and the
legal agreements between the employee and his employer. Often, It is managed
by the department of information technology in any corporation. The sphere of
influence for that censor will include all the infrastructure inside the corporation.
The technical capabilities of this censor are more advanced than home censor to
monitor the staff traffic and activities.
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2.1.3 Service Provider Censor
This censor is motivated by profit and economical reasons. It has the power to
observe and monitor all the traffic that occurs within its infrastructure. It has
the technical capabilities that can remove any unwanted contents placed inside
its infrastructure, or block any inside requests to undesirable outside contents.
Any Internet service provider around the world can be an example of this type of
censor.
2.1.4 Government Censor
The goal of this censor is to remain in power either by good governance or perse-
cution. The sphere of influence for that censor include all the infrastructure inside
its border. It can use any social or technical means to censor all the traffic within
its border. It will force the users to access the allowed contents only, and forbid
any publication of censored contents. Depending on the country, it may involve
arresting or charging those who violate the laws.
2.2 Censor Capabilities and Attacking Techniques
For the censor capabilities, the censor can do two techniques which are blocking or
detection. The term filtering can sometimes be used to refer to blocking. Elahi and
Goldberg al. [5] mentioned six entities that could be censored or attacked by the
censor. In this section, we explain how the censor can apply blocking or detection.
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Figure 2.3: Summary of censor capabilities and attacking techniques
For the attacking techniques, there are logical and physical entities that will be
attacked by the censor to disrupt any unwanted communications to the Internet.
In this section, we mention the censor capabilities for each one of the six entities
followed by the attacking techniques regarding each entity.
2.2.1 Traffic Flows
Packet headers have essential information such as IP addresses and port numbers.
Censors can use this information to detect unwanted packets, and this can be done
using firewalls. Also, censors can go further by keeping track of the links state.
Then the censor will apply deep packet inspection to analyze the payload of the
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packets. The payload could be applications, strings or other protocol patterns.
Deep packet inspection requires more effort based on the censor capabilities. The
censor can do the blocking at this level by dropping any unwanted packets. Also,
the censor can manipulate the traffic to act as a man in the middle to break the
normal flow of the traffic. For example, the Great Firewall of China places itself
between two SSL end points and send reset packets (RST) to both directions.
This action will prevent both sides from making any secure communication, and
therefore the connection will be closed.
Attacking techniques: based on the censorship policy, the censor can moni-
tor the traffic flows inside its network. This is an easy task for the censor to watch
all the traffic if it has the needed technical capabilities.
2.2.2 Infrastructure
The censor’s goal is to block any resources that facilitate censorship resistance or
help the users to publish censored contents. Information that is publicly available
about infrastructures such as routers, servers or hosts can be helpful for the censor
to identify them. In case of secret networks, the censor can play a role of an honest
user or resource to collect information and then block it. The Great Firewall of
China did that by taking the publicly known information of Tor’s relays and then
block the access to them all. Moreover, the Great Firewall of China started to
collect information about the unpublished relays (bridges) to block them as well.
15
In addition to that, Internet service providers can play a significant role to map
Internet identities to real-world information. Therefore, censors can use any legal
pressure to get this information and start the manhunt. The infrastructure could
be inside the censor’s sphere of influence. In that case, the censor will use its legal
pressure to block them. In case that the infrastructure is outside the censor’s
sphere of influence, it can start attacking them if the legal methods did not work.
Attacking techniques: All the components of the censor’s infrastructure
network can be censored and monitored. Servers, routers, databases and even
hosts could be subject to the censorship to make sure that its clear of any violated
contents. The censor could apply other social or technical means to reach its goal
of censoring other contents outside its infrastructure.
2.2.3 Clients
The censor can use software or malware installed on the user’s machine to moni-
tor any activities. This action could be publicly announced by the authority like
the case of Green Dam Youth Escort used by the Chinese authorities in 2009 [6].
This act will give the censor the ability to start the filtering at the client level and
report back to the censor.
Attacking techniques: Tor Browser Bundle is an example of a client software
that helps the user to bypass censorship to view or publish contents. The censor
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can target the software distribution channels or the integrity of that software.
All those techniques used by the censor to stop or monitor any communications
between the client and the censorship resistance network.
2.2.4 People
Individuals can be targeted by the censor to reduce the publication of censored
contents. Authorities can use legal pressure to stop them like the case of Julian
Assange and U.S. government. The authorities will have less control over such
public figures if they are outside the censor’s sphere of influence.
Attacking techniques: The censor can target people such as publishers
or viewers of censored information, designers of censorship resistance systems or
volunteers that aim to facilitate the publication of censored contents. Besides the
technical work, the censor will use other legal influence to limit their activities.
2.2.5 Network Based Views
Networking depends on correct and precise information about the state and topol-
ogy of the network. The censor can use this fact to corrupt the network view and
prevent the client from getting the access to censored contents or anti-censorship
network. The censor can find a way to learn about censorship resistance networks
whether it is publicly known or hidden from the public. Then, the censor will
start to forward subsequent requests to censored and trusted network. This work
17
can be done using many techniques like DNS poisoning and routing table changes.
Attacking techniques: The censor can target the availability of censored
contents by manipulating the network information. The network communications
require correct naming and routing information to reach the destination otherwise
it will fail.
2.2.6 Censorship Resistance System
Censors can use the same techniques used by regular users to discover information
about censorship resistance system. Therefore, the censorship resistance systems
must make it harder for the censor to discover any valuable information. How-
ever, sometimes censors could find tricks and patterns that identify censorship
resistance system. Short lifetimes of SSL certificates used by Tor routers is one
example that can be used to differentiate from the long lifetime normal certificates.
Attacking techniques: The censor has a goal to make it difficult for the
users to start connecting to the censorship resistance systems. The censor will
start to attack all the important entities of the censorship resistance system. In
this way, the censor will attack the availability of those systems. For example,




Like any technology, many obstacles could limit the work of censorship. In this
section, we discuss the most difficulties that face any censorship system.
2.3.1 Technical Limitations
Its a costly task for the censor to do a real-time filtering on each packet. If a
filtering router took an extra two microseconds to process every packet, it would
halve the overall throughput [7]. Some censors break this task into two stages to
reduce the cost. The first stage is to decide if the vast majority of the packets are
uninteresting. The second stage is to process a small set of interesting packets.
2.3.2 Sphere of Influence Limitations
The censor will face many obstacles to control something that is beyond its bor-
ders. Legal pressure or technical attacks will not always work to limit the access
to censored contents. The censor can always block any user’s requests to censored
contents. On the other hand, the users will always find a way to get access to
such contents.
2.3.3 False Positives
We discuss the false positive action from the censor’s point of view. False positives
happened when a legitimate traffic or request is blocked. The censor will try to
keep this as minimum as possible to avoid collateral damage [8]. Censorship
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Figure 2.4: Summary of censor limitations
resistance systems will seek to leverage the collateral damage to develop systems
that can bypass censors. SkypeMorph [9] is an example related to censorship
resistance technique that uses Skype video calls as a cover to bypass censors. The
censor can block all the Skype calls to prevent this technique from working which
will affect other legitimate users.
2.3.4 False Negatives
Also, we discuss the false negatives action form the censor’s point of view. False
negatives mean that the censor is failing to block censored contents. This action
will lead to information leakages and publication of censored contents. Technical
limits and sphere of influence are the main reasons for false negatives to occur.
2.4 Tor and Censorship : Case Study
Tor [10] is an anonymous communication network that helps its users to use the
Internet without disclosure of their identity. The user will use three Tor routers
called ”relays” to build a circuit to surf the Internet through it. Each relay does
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not have any information about the user ”the originator” except the first relay.
Tor relays in one circuit does not have any information about the destination
except the last relay ”Exit node”. The packet in Tor network is encrypted with
three layers ”Onion packet”. This three layer of encryption will allow each relay
to see only what is allowed to see.
Tor is considered as an enemy to censorship because users around the world
use it to access censored contents. The war between Tor and censorship started
in 2006 when some Internet service providers in Thailand blocked the access to
Tor website. They used DNS filtering to redirect Tor users in Thailand to another
web page. Tor network was working, but users could not get Tor software form
the website. In the same year, Websense [11] and SmartFilter [12] came up with
filtering technique to block Tor connections. To understand that, Tor was using
two protocols HTTP to fetch directory information about Tor relays, and TLS to
do the encryption part of Tor. Websense could identify the Tor HTTP directory
requests then blocked it, and users could not get any information about the Tor
relays. The censorship until 2009 was using filtering based on port number or
other information about Tor network like Websense case.
2.4.1 Tor and The Great Firewall of China
One of the strongest opponents of Tor is the Great Firewall of China ”GFW”. At
the time of writing this paper, GFW manages to block the access to all the Tor
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Figure 2.5: Timeline of Tor
relays on the directory authorities. In addition to that, GFW made some active
probing attacks to block Tor’s bridges, and it succeeded to block some of the plug-
gable transports bridges. First, the blocking was implemented merely by simple IP
address blacklisting with the addition to filter the headers of HTTP packets. The
blocking attempts at the begging were straightforward and inflexible. Currently,
the blocking appears to be much more flexible and sophisticated. The GFW was
able to block bridges dynamically without simple enumeration of the IP addresses.
The first step to start using Tor will require the user to connect to the directory
authorities. This step is important to download all the public information of the
Tor relays. After that, all public relays will be downloaded by the client. Then,
the client can start creating the Tor circuits. The team of Tor project noticed
that seven of all eight directory authorities were blocked on the IP layer. To do
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that, the GFW will let the TCP SYN pass, but it will drop the SYN/ACK sent by
the bridge to the client. The same happened when a client tried to connect to a
blocked bridge. However, clients in China are still able to connect to different TCP
ports as well as ping the bridge. The reason for that is the GFW is blocking relays
and bridges based on IP:port tuples instead of only IP addresses to minimize the
collateral damage. By implementing some testing, Tor project team found that
bridges are blocked for approximately 12 hours [13]. Based on the tests done
by Tor team, they concluded that GFW was doing the Tor fingerprinting on the
traffic going from inside China to the outside world, but not in the domestic traffic.
2.5 Internet Filtering in Saudi Arabia
The law in Saudi Arabia is based on (Sharia) or Islamic law. Therefore, some
activities are prohibited by this law such as pornography, everything related to
drinking alcohol, Drugs, etc. Accordingly, the use of the Internet to access such
content is prohibited.
In this section, we discuss the Internet infrastructure in Saudi Arabia since
the beginning. Then, we mention the content filtering regulations and the orga-
nizations responsible for it.
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2.5.1 Internet Infrastructure in Saudi Arabia
In 1997, the government ordered the King Abdulaziz City for Science and Tech-
nology (KACST) [14] to provide the Internet to the residents of Saudi Arabia.
KACST was responsible for building the needed infrastructure to connect to the
international Internet and apply content filtering to provide suitable Internet.
KACST was the only gate to the Internet, and all ISPs were connected to it. The
content filtering was done by KACST, and the ISPs are not involved in this pro-
cess. Figure 2.6 illustrate the Internet infrastructure in Saudi Arabia from 1997
until 2004.
In 2005, after the expansion of the Internet, it became difficult for one place
to do all the work. New decisions have been issued which allow many organiza-
tions and companies to connect directly to the international Internet according to
the applied regulations. The responsibility was assigned to Communications and
Information Technology Commission (CITC) [15] as a supervisory organization.
The content filtering task was assigned to each ISP independently based on the
list provided by CITC. Figure 2.7 illustrate the Internet infrastructure in Saudi
Arabia from 2005 until now.
2.5.2 Content Filtering
As we mentioned previously, the content filtering task was assigned first to KACST.
As a single point of access to the Internet, KACST was applying content filtering
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Figure 2.6: Internet infrastructure in Saudi Arabia from 1997 until 2004
Figure 2.7: Internet infrastructure in Saudi Arabia in 2005
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based on two type of websites lists commercial list and local list. The commercial
list is generated by applications used by KACST which will classify websites based
on the content. This task could be done on the web proxy level of KACST to
ensure that each requested website is allowed. The Internet users can participate
to provide some websites that are not included in the commercial list. The user
or any organization can submit a request to block a website, the request will be
evaluated, and then an action will be made. If the request accepted, the website
will be added to the local list and then blocked.
Nowadays, CITC assigning the content filtering task to each ISP on their web
proxy side. Each ISP is required to perform this task in a suitable way using the
lists provided by CITC. CITC will process any requests for blocking a website,
and if it is accepted the local list will be updated and distributed to the ISPs. The
commercial list will vary from ISP to another based on the tool used on each ISP.
Basically, there are certain categories that will be blocked such as pornography,
gambling, drugs etc.
To request a website blocking, the user should submit a form that has detailed
information about the reasons for such a request. Each request is processed inde-
pendently and seriously, and if the reasons are accepted, then the website will be
blocked. CITC will receive such requests, and they will evaluate it independently.
In case that the website content is categorized as pornography, gambling or drugs,
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Local list of banned sites
Content type Percentage
Pornographic Content 92.80%
Websites that bypass filtration systems 4.43%
Gambling, drugs etc. 2.77%
Table 2.1: The percentage of banned sites types in local list
Figure 2.8: The blocked page when trying to open pornographic site
then they will add it to the banned local list immediately. In case that the request
is related to electronic publishing and intellectual property rights, then the request
will be forwarded to the ministry of culture and media for further investigation.
In case that the request is related to personal affairs, then the request will be
forwarded to the ministry of interior for more investigation. Table 2.1 shows the
percentage the website content type in the local list. Figures 2.8 and 2.9 show the
displayed page when the user is trying to access a banned site.
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Internet users around the world started to act against censorship systems. They
began to develop the systems that aim to bypass the censorship and maintain the
privacy. Those types of systems are called censorship resistance systems (CRS).
The studies related to this topic are under a security field called privacy enhancing
technology (PET).
In this chapter, we cover the classifications of CRS in details which will help
us understand the strategies and methods that are used to bypass the censorship.
Next, we discuss some examples of currently active systems that are used nowadays
as CRS. We explain in details each one of the selected systems to understand the
applied techniques to maintain the privacy.
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3.1 CRS Classification
In this section, we mention the strategies and classes of any CRS to bypass the
censorship systems. The first part of this section is about the resistance strategies
or CORDON. Elahi and Goldberg al. [5] presented a taxonomy of the techniques
used by the censorship resistance systems.
The second part of this section discuss the classes of CRS. So, to design a
CRS, the developer could apply more than one strategy to ensure the stability
and the availability of the CRS. Moreover, at its core, it could belong to one or
more classes.
3.1.1 Resistance Strategies CORDON
Elahi and Goldberg al. [5] provided a taxonomy of censorship resistance strategies
and techniques. They categorized CRS strategies into six types which are also
known as the CORDON taxonomy. In general, censorship resistance systems
could fall into one or more of the CORDON taxonomy. In this section, we mention
the six types of censorship resistance classes which are:
1. Collateral Damage,






Along with the explanation of each type, we discuss the currently available systems
based on the strategies used to bypass the censorship.
Collateral Damage
It is one of the most powerful strategies used, and it is based on causing col-
lateral damage to the censor’s capital as a result of its activities. The damage
can have many effects in many ways such as economic expansion, social peace,
or political power. The idea is to precisely judge the censor’s limitations in the
technical and utility parts. To get this as an advantage, The CRS will produce a
situation where collateral damage is unavoidable. For example, SkypeMorph [9]
is depending heavily on Skype network, and one way to entirely stop this kind of
systems is by blocking any Skype communication. This act by the censorship will
affect other legitimate users that are in need of this service. The power of this
types of censorship resistance techniques is to assume that the censor is unable to
distinguish between censored and allowed content efficiently.
There are popular techniques fall into this class where the CRS will hide
the requests among innocents looking requests. Format-Transforming Encryption
(FTE) [16] is one example of such technique where the traffic is transformed into
innocent looking HTTP requests. Another popular technique is to use existing
31
and hard to block applications or services. Blocking such services will impact the
censor’s capital. For example, email services such as Gmail, and cloud computing
platforms like Amazon Web Services. Meek [17] is one example where it uses the
cloud public services as domain fronting to bypass the censorship.
Outside Scope of Influence
A major weakness that faces the censorship systems is the limitation in their scope
of influence. Resistance systems will try to leverage the cloud services and other
entities that are running outside the censor’s political borders. Tor [10] and Tor
bridges [18] are based on this class, and the Tor team is placing the relays in
different countries across the world.
Rate Limiting
Many resistance systems are facing a challenge regarding how to distinguish the
legitimate user from a censor that act as a user. This obstacle makes the informa-
tion hiding from the censor a challenging issue. The censor may start to collect
more information to launch an attack to block the CRS like the case of Tor and
China [19]. This strategy is applied by Tor to slow the automated scanning for
bridges by using puzzles, such as CAPTCHA and computational tasks.
Decoupled Communication
Sometimes, there is a blind spot in the censorship where the censor is unable
to detect and block the censored traffic efficiently. This blind spot will classify
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the communication as innocent or unrelated to the usual censorship targets. The
circumventor will try to leverage this blind spot by changing the signature of the
bidirectional communication to beat the censor. CensorSpoofer [20] is one example
of this class, where it decouples upstream and downstream data channels. The
client will send the data to a CensorSpoofer proxy over a low bandwidth covert
channel like email. Then, the proxy will send the data back over a UDP channel.
During this process, CensorSpoofer proxy will spoof its source address, so the
packets will appear as if it is originated from some other dummy host. As a
result, there is no IP address for the censor to block because the proxy’s true
address will never appear on the wire.
Overwhelm
It is a fact that the censor has a limited time and resources in use. Therefore,
the censor will have to decide which type of the traffic is allowed or blocked.
This limitation could be an advantage for the CRS to use it as a strategy. The
censor will not be able to deal with every single aspect, and even if it could block
some, others will be allowed. An example of that is the deployment of a massive
number of proxies around the world. Therefore, the censor will face a hard time
to discover all of them. This will cost the censor much time and effort, and will
add more effectiveness in the resistance part. Moreover, the blocking will become
a serious issue when those proxies are honest nodes on the network. Blocking such
resources could make a large portion of the Internet unreachable.
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Figure 3.1: Summary of CORDON taxonomy
No Target
The idea of this class is to try to fool the censor to make it classify the traffic
as a legitimate traffic. Resistance system will try to make the traffic look like
allowed traffic or using allowed protocols. FTE [21] is a good example, it changes
the shape of the traffic to HTTP traffic using port 8080. StegoTorus [7] is an-
other example that implements this strategy by mimicking the HTTP protocol




Censorship resistance systems aim to obfuscate and mimic the application-layer
protocols. Regarding the obfuscation technique, there are two main classes used
by CRS which are traffic obfuscation and destination obfuscation [51]. First, the
traffic obfuscation will aim to change the shape of the targeted traffic to another
form to bypass the censorship. Second, the destination obfuscation will aim to
hide the destination point from being observed by the censor to avoid any blocking
action. Under each one of those classes, there are other subclasses based on the
techniques used by each one of them.
For traffic obfuscation, there are four categories which are randomization,
mimicry, tunneling and programmable systems. The first three types could also
be known as non-programmable systems. On the other hand, for the destination
obfuscation, there are two categories which are proxy and decoy routing.
In this section, we discuss each one of them along with CRS examples of such
systems, see figure 3.2 which does summarize them all.
Traffic Obfuscation
As we mentioned before, the goal of the traffic obfuscation systems is to change
the traffic from suspicious traffic to an innocent looking traffic. The developers of
such systems could use four ways to achieve this goal. First, they can make the
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traffic look as random as possible by adding another layer of encryption to remove
any known patterns, and this is called Randomization. Second, the developers
can make the traffic look like other traffic such as VoIP or regular HTTP traffic,
and this is called Mimicry. Third, they can establish a secure channel between
two points and use this channel to send the traffic through it, and this is called
Tunneling. Fourth, the developers can create a system that merges some of the
mentioned classes to work as one system, and this called Programmable. We
discuss each one of them with the examples.
1. Randomization: If the system is implementing the randomization ap-
proach, then the main idea is to remove any static fingerprints within the
content. Moreover, it will also remove any statistical characteristics of the
connection, and simply the traffic should look like ”nothing”. The obfs2 and
obfs3 [23] are used by Tor project to remove any indicators related to Tor
traffic. The idea of those two protocols introduced after the successful at-
tempts to block Tor traffic in China. The protocol will add another layer of
encryption to hide the connections between the client and the Tor bridges.
After that, there are improvements related to those two protocols which
introduced ScrambleSuit [24] and obfs4 protocols [23]. The Dust system
[25] offers randomization both on the content and the statistical informa-
tion. Dust does that on each packet instead of doing it per-connection. The
previous types of mentioned protocols will work effectively if the censorship
is blocking a specific kind of traffic categorized as bad traffic which is also
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known as blacklist approach.
2. Mimicry: The developers that will apply this approach will try to change
the traffic to mimic another protocol. For example, making the traffic look
like a Skype video call, and this is used by SkypeMorph [9]. Blocking any
Skype calls as a way to stop this protocols will lead to another problem
on the censorship side which is the collateral damage. This problem will
make the censorship block even the legitimate traffic using this application.
StegoTorus [7] is another system used to mimic HTTP protocol based on
previously collected HTTP traffic data, and using various steganographic
techniques. However, there are some studies show that mimicked protocols
can be distinguished from real protocols by using protocol semantics, error
conditions and the dependencies among connections [26].
3. Tunneling: This approach depends on the potential collateral damage
caused by censorship to block popular protocols in a way to avoid packet
filtering. However, these systems are tunneling their data inside the payload
of real requests of the target protocols. For example, Freewave system [27],
uses Skypes voice channel to encode data. Facet [28] uses the Skype video
channel, where SWEET [29] is using the body of email messages. JumpBox
[30] is using web browsers and live web servers as a tunneling approach.
CensorSpoofer [20] also tunnels the data over existing protocols, but uses
a low-capacity email channel for upstream messages and a high-capacity
VoIP channel for downstream. CloudTransport [31] uses another approach
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by tunneling its data using hard to block cloud storage services, like Amazon
S3 instead of a particular protocol. In general, tunneling approaches will
add more overhead than mimicry systems because they are limited by the
low capacity of the protocols used for the tunneling.
4. Programmable: The programmable systems are combining the advantages
of both randomization and mimicry systems. This approach will allow the
system to be configured to perform either strategy. Format-Transforming
Encryption [21] and Marionette [22] are the only systems implementing pro-
grammable traffic obfuscation. FTE is running with Tor as pluggable trans-
ports [32] where it enables the Tor clients to connect to Tor network even if
the only traffic allowed is HTTP. Since there are several attempts by govern-
ments to block clients from connecting to Tor network, the Tor team started
to implement the concept of Tor bridges. Tor bridges are special relays that
are not publicly published. Therefore, it will be used to bypass the censor-
ship then connecting to Tor network. So, even if the censorship blocking
the encrypted connections, then it is possible to be able to connect to Tor
network. On the other hand, Marionette comes with a primary goal which
is developing a system that will not depend on a single traffic obfuscation
method. Instead, it will provide the user with the capability to choose the
obfuscation method that will fit their needs. The user can select the method
based on the target protocols, depth of the controlled traffic features, and
throughput of the network [22].
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Figure 3.2: CRS Classes
Destination Obfuscation
As we mentioned at the beginning of this section, the goal of the CRS in this class
is to hide the destination point from the censorship. There are two subclasses in
the destination obfuscation class which are proxy and decoy routing. In the proxy
approach, the CRS will use the help of other entities as a facilitator to forward
the traffic instead of going directly to the destination. In the decoy routing, the
goal is to fool the censor by deflecting the traffic to an innocent server.
1. Proxy: In this approach, other objects are included as a facilitator to for-
ward the traffic from the CRS client to the CRS server instead of going
directly to the destination. Tor and JAP are two censorship resistance sys-
tems that aim to achieve this goal to maintain the anonymity of their users.
Both systems will hide the destination of the requested server for the cen-
sorship. In addition to that, both systems will hide the identity of the user
from the destination server. In Tor, they apply the concept of relays and
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bridges, wherein JAP they use the mixing servers. Both systems use those
entities in between the client and the destination.
2. Decoy Routing The goal here is to deflect the traffic to an innocent server
by using an intermediate agent. The CRS could use the help of some hard
to block servers in the cloud such as Amazon AWS as a decoy sever. This
process will start with the client connecting to this innocent server. From
that, the server will forward the request to the destination or another decoy
server. The censor will see a connection made to some web server that is
not on the blacklist, and it will allow it. The CRS will maintain the identity
of the real destination hidden from the censor. A CRS applies this method
which is meek, and we will see in the next section how it work.
3.2 CRS Examples
This section is all about different types of censorship resistance systems (CRS).
We cover the most known and active censorship resistance systems. We divide
them into two main categories which are Tor and stand-alone systems. In Tor
category, there are Tor, Tor Browser, Tor bridges and five Tor pluggable trans-
ports. In the second category we mention stand-alone systems which are JAP and
YourFreedom.
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Figure 3.3: Tor Network
3.2.1 Tor and Tor Subsystems
Tor is an anonymous communication network that helps its users to use the In-
ternet without the disclosure of their identity [10]. The user will use three Tor
routers ”relays” to build a circuit to surf the Internet through it. Each relay does
not have any information about the user ”the originator” except the first relay.
Tor relays in a circuit does not have any information about the destination except
the last relay ”Exit node”. The packet in Tor network is encrypted with three
layers ”Onion packet”. This will allow each relay to see only what is allowed to
see.
Tor Browser
To use Tor, users will have to install the Tor Browser Bundle which contain all
the software needed. Tor Browser is the main software in this package, and the
user will use it to access the websites anonymously. While using Tor, it is recom-
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Figure 3.4: Tor and Pluggable Transport Bridges
mended by Tor project to use their browser, because they did much enhancement
to support the user’s privacy. The browser at its core is based on Mozilla’s Ex-
tended Support Release (ESR) Firefox branch [33].
To enhance both privacy and security of this browser, Tor project did many
patches with many changes in the default values of Firefox preferences. The main
part of the browser is Torbutton extension which is responsible for all Tor activ-
ities. Torbutton activities including creating circuits, maintaining the communi-
cation and forwarding the traffic from the browser to Tor network. The browser
is shipped with two extensions which are HTTPS-Everywhere [34] and NoScript
[35]. HTTPS-Everywhere extension is a used to prevent the possibility of Tor
exit node eavesdroppers. This extension will make sure that the user will request
only HTTPS pages. Otherwise, it will notify the user and block it. NoScript
extension is a used to allow trusted and limited websites which are selected by
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the user to execute JavaScript, Java, Flash and other plugins. This extension will
prevent any exploitation of security vulnerabilities that are caused by such plugins.
If the public Tor network is blocked, then Tor browser can activate the plug-
gable transports. The browser currently supporting the following protocols obfs3,
obfs4, Scramblesuit, meek, and FTE. Moreover, Tor project changed several Fire-
fox preferences and applied many patches to the browser. The implementation
phase of changing the browser has many goals to achieve. We mention some of
them as following:
• Proxy Obedience : The goal here is to force Firefox to connect to Tor
directly as a SOCKS proxy. This can be done by setting some preferences
like (network.proxy.socks.X) to point to Tor application. Additionally, they
also prevent proxy bypass using WebRTC by disable it at compile time
and change the value of (media.peerconnection.enabled) to false. Moreover,
plugins are disabled to prevent them from doing any kind of OS system
calls and proxy bypassing. With each release, they perform in-depth code
auditing and apply any patches.
• State Isolation : The state of Tor browser is separated from the state of
the existing browser by using custom Firefox profile. Also, the root directory
of the TBB is the home environment of the browser.
• Avoid Writing to Disk : The goal here is to prevent the browser from
writing any records of the browsing activities to the disk. This can be done
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by changing the preferences to enable Firefox private browsing, and disable
any media cache.
• Application Data Isolation : The goal here is to prevent the browser from
saving any data outside the bundle directory. This will help to prevent the
users from leaving any pieces of evidence after using the browser, especially
when saving the files to the local disk. Data isolation is ensured by setting
the preferences of browser downloads to point to the bundle directory.
• Browser Fingerprinting : In Tor browser, there are some defenses applied
to defeat browser fingerprinting. First, all plugins in Tor browser are dis-
abled to prevent them from producing unique fingerprints that could identify
the browser. Flash is the only one available with limited features. The rest
are completely blocked. Second, Tor browser uses a predefined set of fonts
shipped across platforms which will be used by the websites without using
the system fonts. Third, automatically resizing the browser windows to pre-
vent any leakage of information about the monitor size of the user. This is
done by Firefox patch and preferences such as (privacy.resistFingerprinting).
Fourth, they provide two Firefox patches to take care of the keyboard layout
fingerprinting by providing fake properties. Fifth, they provide all websites
with identical user agent and HTTP headers. This can be done by changing
the preferences of the user agent. Sixth, to defeat locale Fingerprinting for
non-English users, they fix all locale to windows-1252. There are around
24 browser fingerprinting defenses [33] applied in Tor browser. They are
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Figure 3.5: HTTP pipelining and randomized requests
applied either by changing Firefox preferences or by applying patches.
• Long Term Unlinkability : To achieve that, an option for a new identity
is available in Torbutton menu. The browser will make sure that all data of
the current state cleared before issuing the new identity.
• Website Traffic Fingerprinting Defenses : Currently, Tor project ap-
plies HTTP pipelining [36] as website traffic fingerprinting defenses. It is
deployed as Firefox patch to enable HTTP pipelining, randomize the size
of pipeline and the order of requests as in figure 3.5. Part of it could be
achieved by configuring Firefox preferences (network.http.pipelining.X) to
true, while the randomization is achieved by the patch. There are some
WF defense considered but not deployed which are HTTPOS [37], Adaptive
Padding [38] and BUFLO [39].
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Tor Bridges
Tor relays are publicly published to all users through servers called directory
authorities. There are ten directory authorities that will help Tor clients to learn
the list of all relays to use Tor network [18]. Countries like China and Iran
started to block directory authorities which prevented the users from accessing
Tor network. To solve this issue, Tor introduced ”Bridges” as relays that are
not listed in the main directory authorities. In case the censor starts to block
all the relays in Tor network, it probably cannot block all the bridges since there
is no complete public list of them. Users can use Tor directly, and they can
switch to use bridges once the Tor is blocked. Tor Browser Bundle which is the
client software used to connect to Tor network can perform this task quickly [18].
Tor users also can ask for the bridges using Tor bridges database [40]. There
are several bridges distribution strategies used by Tor to deliver the bridges IP
address. Currently, there are five strategies used by Tor which are Time-based,
Location-based, Combined time and location-based, Mailing list, Emailing Tor
project and Social network.
1. Time-based: If Tor has one hundred good bridges, then only ten of them
will be available in a given hour. Next hour, it will change to next group of
bridges and so on. This will make a hundred bridges hidden from the censor
at a given time.
2. Location-based : Requests for bridges from a specific IP address will get a
set of a specific bridge based on the location. This will limit some countries
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from learning all the bridges unless they have censors around the world.
3. Combined time and location based: This method will combine the
above two strategies to make it harder for the censor to learn about the
bridges. At one time slot based on the location, the bridges distribution will
be fixed.
4. Mailing list: By starting a mailing list and allowing the people to sign
up as receivers. Censors could be part of that list and start to block the
bridges.
5. Emailing Tor project: The user will send an email to Tor project asking
for bridges. The user should provide legitimate Gmail or Yahoo account to
receive the bridge address. Tor project will reply once only, and leave the
automated account creation problem to Google and Yahoo to prevent.
6. Social network: Tor can send some of the bridges to trusted users in a
specific country through social networks. Users then will distribute them to
others in the same manner.
The arms race continued between censors and Tor, and censors could block
some bridges. On the other hand, Tor will have to add more solutions to circum-
vent censorship, and this is the beginning of the pluggable transports.
47
Figure 3.6: Tor Pluggable Transport
Tor Pluggable Transport
The main idea of pluggable transports (PT) [32] is to change all Tor traffic between
the client and the bridge before the first relay. This action will make the traffic
look like something else other than Tor. The reason behind pluggable transports
is that censors started to use Deep Packet Inspection ”DPI” to analyze Tor traffic
flows. The censor will see innocent-looking traffic to unlisted Tor relay ”bridge”,
and it will allow it. Any Tor user can contribute to help other users by configuring
the machine to act as pluggable transport bridge server. The IP address of the
PT-bridge servers will not be publicly listed on the directory authorities. Clients
will use TBB as a pluggable transport client, and start to connect to Tor network
through the PT-bridges as in figure 3.6. Currently, Tor Browser Bundle supports
five types of pluggable transports [32] obfs3, obfs4, ScrambleSuit, meek and FTE.
Each one of the five systems is considered as a CRS. Some of them have its
own implementation as stand-alone system such as FTE. Others like obfs3 and
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Figure 3.7: Tor Pluggable Transport obfs2
obfs4 are designed and implemented by Tor project team. We explain the idea
behind each one of them.
Tor Pluggable Transport - obfsX
The first protocol used to obfuscate the traffic of Tor is the twobfuscator (obfs2)
[41]. The idea started after the blocking of eight directory authorities in some
countries. The obfs2 is the first pluggable transport implemented as a proof-of-
concept obfuscation protocol. The protocol was simple and just protect against
fingerprintable TLS content patterns. It does not provide authentication, data
integrity or hide data lengths. It adds another layer of encryption using AES-
CTR-128 on top of Tor packet. The problem with obfs2 is that they did not
perform the key exchange by using asymmetric cryptography. Because of that,
any passive attacker in the middle can observe the keys and decrypt the traffic to
see the actual Tor communication.
As an improvement to obfs2, obfs3 [42] was implemented. To solve the obfs2
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problem, obfs3 negotiate the keys using public key cryptography. Specifically,
they used an anonymous Diffie Hellman key exchange. They used custom Diffie
Hellman protocol proposed by Ian Goldberg [43]. The reason for using custom
Diffie Hellman protocol is that the traditional Diffie Hellman is not suitable for
their situation. This means that a passive eavesdropper will not be able to find
the key by just monitoring the traffic. As in obfs2, obfs3 add another layer of
encryption using AES-CTR-128 on top of Tor packet. There are two problems
facing obfs3, authentication in key exchange phase and active probing attacks. For
the first problem, the user and the bridge did not have any shared keys or public
keys for signatures to authenticate each other before making the connection. So,
an attacker can play a role of man in the middle that could fool both sides to
make the traffic go through him. The second problem that obfs3 facing is active
probing attacks against the bridges. The problem starts when a user connects
to a bridge somewhere on the Internet, and the censor notices that connection.
The censor will investigate this connection by making a connection to the bridge
directly. If the bridge accepts the connection, then the censor will just block that
bridge which is exactly what the Great Firewall of China did [19]. ScrambleSuit
was introduced later to solve some of the obfs3 challenges as we mention later in
this section.
To solve the challenges on obfs2, obfs3 and ScrambleSuit, the latest PT intro-
duced which is obfs4 [44]. As in obfs2 and obfs3, obfs4 mainly goal is to provide an
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Figure 3.8: Tor Pluggable Transport obfs3
obfuscation layer on top of an authenticated protocol such as TLS or SSH. More-
over, obfs4 provide authentication, data integrity, and protection against several
attacks such as passive Deep Packet Inspection and active probing. ScrambleSuit
and obfs3 use custom Diffie Hellman protocol for key exchange which has several
issues in performance and authentication. Instead, obfs4 uses high-speed elliptic
curve cryptography specifically, Curve25519 public keys and Elligator 2 mapping
[45] for transmitting data. In Deep Packet Inspection and active probing attacks,
the attacker should get two type of information to proceed which are the node ID
and the public key of the obfs4 server. In case the attacker wants to pretend to
be an obfs4 server, he needs to have the node ID, the public, and private keys.
Tor Pluggable Transport - ScrambleSuit
To defend against active probing and some fingerprinting techniques, ScrambleSuit
[24] was introduced as a thin protocol layer on top of TCP. The goal of Scramble-
Suit is to obfuscate the application data transported. They use techniques such
as morphing and a secret exchanged out-of-band [24]. ScrambleSuit aim to hide
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Figure 3.9: Tor Pluggable Transport obfs4
several features of Tor’s communication such as payload, packet length distribu-
tion and inter-arrival times. ScrambleSuit will encrypt the traffic to conceal Tor’s
payload and its fingerprints such as Tor’s TLS cipher list. Also, ScrambleSuit
will seek to hide the well-known characteristic of Tor which the 586-byte packet
size by using a randomly chosen distribution of packet sizes. ScrambleSuit will
change the inter-arrival times by applying small and random sleep intervals before
sending the data on the wire.
ScrambleSuit server will not accept any connection unless the client presents
a secret value that is exchanged out-of-band. After the client prove that he has
the secret value, the client starts to authenticate himself. Authentication phase
in ScrambleSuit can be done using two methods which are session ticket or cus-
tom Diffie Hellman handshake. If the client does not has a session ticket, then a
custom Diffie Hellman handshake is conducted with new session ticket issued for
future connections. Client and server will agree on a 192-byte random number.
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Figure 3.10: Tor Pluggable Transport ScrambleSuit
This random number will be hashed using SHA256 to get the 256-bit master key.
The master key then used to derive the session keys [46]. The encryption of the
traffic is done by applying AES-CBC with a 128-bit key.
ScrambleSuit and obfs3 share the concept of using custom Diffie Hellman pro-
tocol for key exchange. Moreover, the use of secret value will help to prevent
active probing attacks that are done by the censors. The successor of Scramble-
Suit is obfs4, which solve some issues regarding the performance of custom Diffie
Hellman and the authentication of the server.
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Figure 3.11: Tor Pluggable Transport meek
Tor Pluggable Transport - meek
This protocol is based on domain fronting [17] by encoding a data stream as a
sequence of HTTPS requests and responses. The requests will go through a hard-
to-block third-party web server to avoid talking to Tor bridge directly [17].
The idea of meek is to put the allowed domain on the outside of the request. In
particular, the allowed domain is placed on the DNS query and the Server Name
Indication (SNI) TLS extension. The forbidden domain will be on the inside of
the request, specifically in the Host header of the HTTP request. The allowed
domain is the address of the intermediate server. The forbidden domain is the
address of the bridge where the meek server is placed. This deception will work
when some web services ignore to check SNI and process the request based on the
Host header. Amazon CloudFront and Google App Engine are used to implement
this pluggable transport. Censors will see the clients communicating with the
allowed domain, and it will pass it.
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Figure 3.12: Tor Pluggable Transport FTE
Tor Pluggable Transport - FTE
FTE is introduced as a solution in case that the cryptographic protocols are
blocked. Most of the deep packet inspection (DPI) systems use the regular ex-
pression and keyword search against application layer packets. FTE will make
sure that every output will not raise any DPI flags especially in case of keyword
search for blocked content. This can be done by encrypting and encoding the
packets so that they will pass any regular expression check. The traffic will look
like (mimicry) HTTP traffic and absent any flagged keywords [16].
Technically, it is called FTE proxy system [47] which consist of two components
client and server. They are communicating with each other in a way that any
censor in between will see the traffic as normal HTTP connection using port
8080. FTE client should be in a place where the Internet is censored, and some
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websites are not available in that area. On the other hand, FTE server should be
on the uncensored network to make the FTE client benefit from that connection.
3.2.2 Stand alone Systems
There are some stand-alone CRS that are around. They have a different concept
than Tor, but they share the concept of censorship resistance systems.
JAP JonDo
The structure of JAP system is based on the concept of web-mixing and proxy ser-
vices [48]. It consists of four components which are Java Anon Proxy (JAP), mix
servers, cache proxies and InfoService. JAP application is the client-side software
and has only one connection to a mix server using TCP/IP Internet connections.
The mix server has only one connection to one or two other mix servers. There
are three types of mix servers first, middle and last mix server. The mix server
which has a connection to the JAP is called the first mix. The mix server which
sends the packets to the cache proxy is called the last mix. The mix server with
two connections to other mix servers is called middle mix.
The first mix server will receive the traffic from different JAP users at the
same time. It will scramble the order of the received data streams, and change
their look by applying new encryption phase. The middle mix server job is to re-
ceive packets from a mix server and forward them to the other mix server. Cache
proxies are the last parts in the JAP system which will make the connections to
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the Internet. The traffic will be received from the last mix to the cache proxy
to communicate with servers outside JAP system. The cache proxy will receive
the response, then forward it back to the client through the mixes in reverse order.
The packets that are transmitted from JAP to the cache proxy then to the
Internet will go through a chain of connected mixes called MixCascade. There are
different MixCascade existed at the same time, JAP client application will select
only one of them. This selected MixCascade will remain active for the whole ses-
sion until the client logs out.
InfoService provides meta-information regarding JAP system such as available
MixCascades, information about mix servers, number of users, etc. Figure 3.13
illustrates JAP system structure and components.
To use JAP, the user will configure the browser to use JAP as a local proxy.
The default settings are localhost with port 4001, but this can be editable. The
client starts JAP which will connect to InfoService. This step will make sure that
the software used by JAP and the mix servers are compatible. Then, JAP will
register to the first mix by opening a TCP/IP connection. The first mix will reply
with information about the MixCascade. It includes the public keys of the mix
servers using XML format. JAP will send a special MixPacket encrypted with
the public key of the first mix containing two symmetric keys. Each key size is
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Figure 3.13: JAP System
16 random bytes. One key will be used for packets between JAP and first mix.
The other key will be used for packets between first mix and JAP. The browser
will be configured to send the packets through JAP. Then, JAP will encrypt the
packets using the first key mentioned above to the first mix. After that, the first
mix will mix the data that is coming from other clients in one MixCascade to the
next mix server.
The packets used in JAP system known as MixPacket with a fixed size of 998
bytes. MixPacket is consist of channel-ID (4 bytes), flag (2 bytes) and data (992)
bytes. For every mix, the channel-ID and the data will be changed because each
mix will do a single encryption and decryption. The encryption methods used by
JAP are RSA with 1024-bit key length and AES with 128-bit key length. The
encryption methods used by mixes are AES-128/128 with the OFB-128 mode.
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Figure 3.14: YourFreedom CRS
YourFreedom
YourFreedom [49] is one of the most popular CRS used nowadays. Besides sup-
porting most desktop operating systems, it also has an android app with around
five million downloads. Based on Freedom House [50] survey, YourFreedom is one
of the top ten CRS used in Iran in 2011. They explicitly mentioned on their web-
site [49] that YourFreedom is a connectivity service only, not a perfect anonymizer,
VPN nor firewall.
Technically, YourFreedom is a java application that applies the concept of tun-
neling. With around 39 tunneling servers in 10 different countries that support
different tunnel modes such as HTTPS, FTP, UDP, HTTP/POST/CGI and DNS.
The idea behind YourFreedom is to turn the client’s computer into a web proxy
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and a SOCKS proxy. Once the user runs the client application, it will connect
to one of the available servers using one of the tunneling modes. This method
will allow the local applications to use the client side of YourFreedom instated of
going directly to the Internet. Then, it will communicate with the server side of
the system.
One scenario of using YourFreedom starts with a user wishes to fetch Wikipedia
page using Firefox browser. The user will start the client application, and he will
choose the tunneling mode with the server that supports it. Once that prepared,
the user should configure the browser to use SOCKS port 1080 and web proxy
port 8080. After that, the request will go from the browser to YourFreedom client-
side application. Then, the client-side application will tunnel the request using
the chosen mode, and send it to the server side. The server will communicate
with Wikipedia server to ask for the page. Then, The response will return from




In chapters 2 and 3, we explained the two conflicting parties which are censor-
ship and CRS. Censorship can use many methods to attack CRS systems, and
fingerprinting attack is one of them. Fingerprinting means that an eavesdropper
can apply a traffic analysis on the encrypted traffic generated by the CRS to get
some information about that traffic. In general, fingerprinting could be based on
the following methods which are destinations, content, flow properties or protocol
semantics [51].
• Fingerprint Destinations, a flow can be linked with a protocol based on
the destination information that is acquired from the connection tuple. The
destination port is a typical target of censorship, for example, HTTP uses
port 80. Also, flows with destination IP addresses that are associated with
the blacklist systems could be interrupted by censorship.
• Fingerprint Content, flows can be fingerprinted by some strings that
are specific to some protocols. For example, blacklisted keywords, domain
61
names and HTTP hosts that could be inside the content of the traffic. DPI
systems could perform a regular expression based traffic classification to
identify such strings.
• Fingerprint Flow Properties, packet length, and timing-related features
such as inter-arrival times and burstiness could be used to identify the type
of the traffic. The censor could fingerprint some protocols by creating a
statistical model based on the mentioned traffic properties.
• Fingerprint Protocol Semantics, the censor can fingerprint the traffic
based on the behavior of that protocol. The censor will trigger different types
of active manipulation to see how the protocol behavior. For example, what
will happen in case of dropping, injecting, modifying and delaying of the
packets?
Censorship already applied some of those fingerprinting attacks against CRS.
For example, Tor was attacked by blocking all the public IP addresses that were
published in the directory authorities (Fingerprint Destinations).
In this chapter, we explain a different type of fingerprinting attacks which is
website fingerprinting attacks. In this attack, the censorship will try to identify
the website visited by the user while using any CRS. This type of attack depends
on machine learning and the traffic analysis of the encrypted traffic.
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4.1 Website Fingerprinting Attacks
Website Fingerprinting (WF) is a specific type of fingerprinting attacks. WF at-
tack will help some local and passive network eavesdroppers to identify the web
page accessed by a client by using traffic analysis [52]. The position of the at-
tacker could be in any router between the user and the destination website. This
powerful yet invisible threat could be implemented by several entities such as
Government, ISP, network administrator or secret services. Each one of those
entities may use WF attacks for different purposes such as censoring, surveillance
or advertisements. Despite that the traffic is encrypted, the attacker will act as
a passive network eavesdropper without the need to decrypt the traffic. The at-
tacker will start to collect the victim’s traffic, then apply machine classification
to that collected information. Based on that results, the attacker can guess which
web page was visited by the victim.
The following scenario is assumed by any WF methods [53]. The scenario
starts with a user who wants to protect his web browsing activities. To achieve
that, the user will use any CRS that will hide the traffic from any third parties.
This task can be done by installing a dedicated software to establish a secure and
encrypted link between his machine and a trusted server on the Internet. On the
other hand, the attacker who wants to apply WF attack should be able to do three
things. First, record the victim’s traffic, this is essential to get the information
about the victim’s browsing activities. Second, the attacker’s location is between
63
the victim and the CRS trusted server. The location of the attacker will help him
to get the victim’s real IP address. Third, the attacker has the power to identify
the victim based on the IP address.
There are two phases of WF attack which are training phase and testing phase.
In the training phase, the attack will start to monitor and store a set of censored
websites. The set of websites could be large or small number of websites based
on what interests the attacker. In the testing phase, the attacker will record the
encrypted traffic of the targeted user. Then, the attacker will use machine classi-
fication to creates the fingerprints. In the end, the attacker will try to match the
results with the stored records form the training phase.
We test two types of WF attacks which are Optimal String Alignment Distance
(OSAD) also know as Cai-OSAD attack et al. [54][55] and k-Nearest Neighbours
(k-NN) classifier [56].
4.1.1 OSAD Attack
In 2012, Cai et al. [54] improved the accuracy of WF on Tor. They modi-
fied the kernel of Support Vector Machine (SVM) which used to classify traffic
instances in classes that match the collected site. The representation of the clas-
sification instances for each traffic trace is consist of a series of (positive or neg-
ative) packet lengths. Training and testing phases are based on SVM with the
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Damerau-Levenshtein edit distance. Damerau-Levenshtein distance between two
traces t and t’ is the minimum number of operations to transform a trace t to
t’. The operations are insertions, deletions, substitutions, and transposition. The
mentioned operations are corresponding to two operations that could occur on
the packets inside a stream which are discarding and reordering [57].
In 2013, Wang and Goldberg et al. [55] improved the accuracy of Cai-OSAD
on Tor. The attack is also known as Wa-OSAD. They made some modifications
to the distance computation. Moreover, they removed the substitutions from the
list of operations in Damerau-Levenshtein distance. The reason to remove such
operation is that substitutions do not correspond to the different trace when they
repeatedly load the same page. The second modification was increasing the cost
of outgoing packet operations. That is because it is less likely to have a different
number of outgoing packets than a different number of incoming packets for the
same page. The third modification was making the transposition cost varied over
the packet sequence. They made the transposition cost larger near the top of the
packet sequence and with a lower cost at the end of the sequence. That is be-
cause packets at the beginning of the sequence will be less affected by the random
changes because of network conditions.
To perform this type of attack, we need to collect samples of a set of websites
using different CRS. Once the samples of each type of CRS is collected, the packet
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sequence of OSAD attacks could be in one of three forms as the following.
• Raw packet sequence: which means that the packet sequence will be
without any changes.
• Rounded packet sequence: which means that each packet size in the raw
packet sequence will be raised to the nearest multiple of 600. For example,
a packet size of 512 will be rounded to 600, 1024 will be rounded to 1200.
• Fixed length sequence: which means taking only the first 500 of each
raw packet sequence.
4.1.2 kNN attack
There are two scenarios regarding WF attacks, close world, and open world. Close
world means that the training and testing phase will target a specific set of web-
sites know as monitored pages. The attacker’s goal is to be able to recognize
if a client visited a monitored page included in that set. Any visits outside the
monitored pages will not be recognized. In more realistic environments the client
can visit a page that is not included in the selected set of monitored pages which
means the open world. In open world, there is a set of monitored pages that will
be used in the training phase and another set of the non-monitored page. The
attacker will train the classifier to identify if the client visits a monitored page or
at least give the fact that the client visited a non-monitored page.
To address the problem of the open world scenario, Wang et al. [56] designed
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k-Nearest Neighbours (k-NN) also know as (Wa-kNN). The k-nn classifier uses
distance metric to find the similarity between two packet sequences P and P’. The
distance metric function depending on two main inputs which are features F and
weights W. For features, they want the results to be accurate even if the client
applies some defenses that can remove some features from the available feature
set. For example, if Tor removes the feature of the unique packet lengths. They
have a list of 4226 features, and each feature is a function F that takes a packet
sequences P [52]. For example, there are 100 features which are the length of the
first 100 bursts. Another ten features for the direction of the first ten packets.
The weight learning process in k-NN is called Weight Learning by Locally
Collapsing Classes (WLLCC). This process applied to reduce the weights for less
interesting features information. This action will make the classifier focus on the
features that are more useful for the classification process.
We collected the samples from a set of websites using different CRS to apply
k-NN attack. Once the samples of each type of CRS is collected, the packet
sequence of k-NN attacks could be in one of three forms.
• Cells: the packet sequence will consist the time arrival of each packet and
(+ or -) 1 based on the direction of each packet. The number 1 here will
represent the cell count in each packet of Tor traffic.
• Time and packet size: means that the packet sequence will consist the
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time arrival of each packet and (+ or -) packet size based on the direction
of that packet.
• Packet size only: means that the packet sequence consists of (+ or -)
packet size only based on the direction of that packet.
4.2 Website Fingerprinting Defenses
WF defenses aim to defeat or at least reduces the damage of WF. Each defense
follows different approach, but all of them could be in one of two main categories,
limited or general [52]. Limited defenses are designed to reduce the damage of a
specific type of WF attack. General defenses are more powerful to defeat different
types of WF attacks. We studied and applied five types of WF defenses which
are Traffic morphing, HTTP Obfuscation, Decoy pages as limited defenses. On
the other hand, the general defenses are BuFLO and Tamaraw.
4.2.1 Traffic morphing
In 2009, Wright et al. [58] published Traffic morphing defense. The process of
Traffic morphing is to randomly pad some unique packet lengths to the traffic to
mimic another website traffic. This process will make those packet lengths look
like another set of web pages packets. The goal is to change the packet sequence
to mimic the packet sequences from another website, for example, google.com.
Traffic morphing is designed to defeat statistical analysis attacks. Specifically, it
changes the unique packet lengths of the traffic. However, Traffic morphing will
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Figure 4.1: Limited WF defenses
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not cover sequence length, packet order, or the timing of each packet.
4.2.2 HTTPOS split
In 2011, Luo et al. [37] published HTTP Obfuscation which also know as (HTTPOS).
There is a large number of features in HTTPOS, one of them is to split or pad
unique packet lengths randomly. Practically, HTTPOS defense means that if we
have a positive packet (outgoing packets), then it will always pad it to the MTU
which is 1500. Moreover, if we have a negative packet (Incoming packets), then
we have three cases:
• if the absolute value of the packet size is more than or equal 1400, then do
not change.
• if the absolute value of the packet size is between 1399 and 1, then return a
random number r between 1 and (absolute value of packet size -1). Finally,
add a packet with size (-r) and another packet with size (packet size + r).
• Else, leave the packet size as it is.
4.2.3 Decoy pages
In 2011, Panchenko et al. [59] proposed a defense based on adding background
noise to the traffic which called Decoy pages. It was designed to defeat their WF
attack which called FeaturesSVM. The defense is based on loading a decoy page
once the client visits a page simultaneously. This process will make the attacker
ineffectively able to recognize between the real and decoy pages.
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Figure 4.2: General WF defenses
4.2.4 BuFLO
In 2012, Dyer et al. [39] presented a defense called Buffered Fixed-Length Ob-
fuscator (BuFLO) as the first general WF defense. This WF defense causes the
transmission length to be extended with more dummy packets inserted to fill the
gaps. BuFLO transmits fixed size packets for a fixed amount of time in both
directions. If there is no application data left to send, it will fill the gap with junk
data which will be removed on the other side.
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4.2.5 Tamaraw
As an improvement to BuFLO, Wang and Goldberg et al. [60] presented Tamaraw
in 2014. Tamaraw is similar in operations to BuFLO with more improvement in
packet padding, packet scheduling, and sequence padding. One option of BuFLO
is to pad all packets to the MTU which is 1500 bytes, while Tamaraw will pad
the packets to a value that is less than 1500 to reduce the bandwidth overhead.
Based on their study, they found that the number of incoming packets is around
ten times the number of outgoing packets. Based on that results, Tamaraw will





In this chapter, we discuss the preparation phase for conducting the empirical
analysis of censorship resistance systems. First, we will illustrate the selected
systems in our work. Then, we explain how we did the environment setup with
all the needed software. After that, we discuss the data collection phase with all
the details. Finally, we will mention some of the challenges we faced during this
part.
5.1 CRS Selection
Our goal is to conduct an empirical analysis of censorship resistance systems. To
do that, we need to select a set of censorship resistance systems. There are a
lot of CRS published in academic papers, but a few of them are deployed and
active. Therefore, we only target the systems that are deployed and used around
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# CRS CRS Class Language Stand-alone? Selected Browser
1 Tor Proxy C Yes TBB and Firefox
2 obfs3 Randomization Python No- Tor PT TBB and Firefox
3 obfs4 Randomization Go No- Tor PT TBB and Firefox
4 ScrambleSuit Randomization Python No- Tor PT TBB and Firefox
5 meek Decoy Routing Go No- Tor PT Firefox
6 FTE Programmable Python/C++ No- Tor PT TBB
7 JAP Proxy Java Yes Firefox
8 YourFreedom Proxy Java Yes Firefox
Table 5.1: The selected CRS on our research
the world.
We started with Tor, and it is a well-known anonymity system. Tor is active
and heavily used by a large group of users around the world. The Tor project
team manages the system with regular updates and patches.
In case Tor blocked, then the users will start to use the Tor pluggable trans-
ports bridges. As we mentioned before, Tor supports five pluggable transports
which are obfs3, obfs4, ScrambleSuit, meek and FTE. Those five CRS are de-
ployed as part of Tor, and they are active. Therefore, we included those five CRS
in our set. In the next section, we see how to deploy each one of them.
Beside Tor, there are other stand-alone censorship resistance systems used
nowadays. For example, JAP and YourFreedom are both active and deployed.
Both systems are based on Java which will support the installation on different
platforms. Therefore, we included them in our set of CRS.
The goal of this phase was to include as much CRS as we can to our set. In
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table 5.1, we summarized the selected systems that are used in our research. The
table shows each system and the class that belongs to it. The last column shows
the selected type of browser that each CRS will use in our research.
5.2 Environment Setup
After we selected the set of CRS, we need to deploy each one of them indepen-
dently. In this phase, we deploy each CRS with different browsers. Once we
deploy each one of them, then we start to collect the network traces to analyze
them.
For Tor, the user can use Tor Browser Bundle (TBB) or any other browser
after configuring it to use Tor. For a user who wants to use Tor with another
browser, he or she can use Tor source code, compile it and run it. After that, the
user will change the browser’s network configuration to send the traffic through
Tor application using SOCKS. We selected FireFox browser to run it with Tor
and Tor-PT systems.
For Tor source code, we used tor-0.2.8.7 [1]. For Tor pluggable transports, we
need to have the bridge’s information for the five selected PTs. To do that we
selected bridges from Tor bridges database [40]. As a common practice among
the Tor community, it is not ethical to publish the address of the bridges, but the
information of those bridges are with the authors. We used the same bridges to
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collect the traces of each Tor pluggable transport with TBB and FireFox. To do
that, we edited the torrc file used in both Tor source code and TBB. The torrc
file is a Tor configuration file used to guide Tor application to use bridges instead
of connecting directly to Tor network.
For each Tor pluggable transports, we need the client software besides the
bridge’s information. The client-side software will help to encrypt and decrypt
the traffic between the client and the bridge. Those programs are shipped with
TBB by default because TBB is a portable software. On the other hand, using
Tor by running the source code will add another step which is installing those
programs manually. For obfs3 and ScrambleSuit we have to use a software called
obfsproxy [61]. For obfs4 we have to install another software called obfs4proxy
[62]. For FTE we have to install fteproxy [47]. Finally, the client software for meek
is called meek-client [63]. Each installation process is done on Ubuntu operating
system and mentioned in the appendix.
JAP [64] is a stand-alone software, and it comes without a dedicated browser
like Tor. It is based on Java, therefore the user needs java of version 1.4 or above.
We used JAP 00.20.001 with Firefox, and configure the browser to use the proxy
with port 4001 to make the traffic go through JAP. There are two types of ac-
counts for JAP users free and premium. The free account will allow the user to
access free JAP services which are limited to a few number of free servers. We
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# Traffic type Client Application Browser abbr.
1 Normal Traffic without CRS - Firefox NT-FF
2 Tor only Tor Bundle TBB Tor-TBB
3 Tor only Tor source code Firefox Tor-FF
4 Tor with obfs3 Tor Bundle TBB obfs3-TBB
5 Tor with obfs3 Tor code+obfsproxy Firefox obfs3-FF
6 Tor with obfs4 Tor Bundle TBB obfs4-TBB
7 Tor with obfs4 Tor code+obfs4proxy Firefox obfs4-FF
8 Tor with ScrambleSuit Tor Bundle TBB SS-TBB
9 Tor with ScrambleSuit Tor code+obfsproxy Firefox SS-FF
10 Tor with meek Tor code+meek Firefox meek-FF
11 Tor with FTE Tor Bundle TBB FTE-TBB
12 JAP JAP application Firefox JAP-FF
Table 5.2: The collected samples with different setups
used the free account, and it was enough to collect the needed traces. JAP soft-
ware is just a jar file that any user can run it simply using any operating system.
At the end of this phase, we are successfully able to deploy 12 different setups.
The next phase will be collecting the network traces of each setup. The different
samples are explained in table 5.2. Notice that YourFreedom is not included, and
that is due to some challenges which are explained in the next section.
5.3 Data Collection
Our goal is to collect the samples of 100 websites, and each website will be visited
40 times. For that, we selected a set which consists of the top 100 websites based
on Alexa’s website ranking. Then, with each setup mentioned in table 5.2, we visit
each one of the 100 websites 40 times. All packets of each visit will be recorded
in a separate file using tshark 2.2.6 [66]. The browser used to fetch all the pages
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is FireFox 50.0.2 [67], and for TBB we used TBB-linux-32-7.0.2 [1]. We used a
virtual machine running Ubuntu 32-bit 16.04 LTS with a memory of 3GB. We
make sure that the machine is not connected to any services that could add noise
to the collected samples such as cloud services.
To make the process of collecting the samples automated, we used python [68]
with several tools. We developed a python script that opens the browser using
selenium-3.0.2 [69] to request the targeted website. At the same time, the script
will run tshark command to capture the packets of that request. Once this process
is done, the captured packets will be saved in a file with pattern website-sample.
For example, the file named 10-20 means that this is for website number 10 and
sample number is 20. We have to make sure that each file is valid trace sample by
comparing the size of the file with the average. The file with a size less than 50%
of the average is deleted and considered as bad trace, and then we redo that visit.
This process will guarantee that all the samples are valid and ready for next phase.
After we collected the samples, we did another process of cleaning the data
from any noises or unneeded data. First, we learn all the IP addresses on each
trace and check each IP address organization. For example, If we find an IP related
to Ubuntu organization we classify this IP as an unwanted address. Therefore,
the packets will not be included in the process. As suggested by all the researcher,
we have to ignore all the packets that are not important such as ACK, SYN, RST
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or FIN. This kind of packets are considered as noise, and we only focus on pack-
ets that carry the data which will be in packets of flag PSH. We implemented a
python program to process all those tasks since the data set is huge.
At the end of this phase, we collected 12 different types of data sets. The total
number of the network traces are 48000 files with size more than 140 GB. We use
those files in our experiments after we extract the need information.
We do three different classes of experiments which are statistical analysis,
HTTP archive format analysis, and website fingerprinting attacks. Each class will
need a specific type of data from the collected sets. For example, WF attack
requires a specific information and particular naming patterns. For instance, the
k-NN attack accept traces as website-sample, while Cai-OSAD and Wa-OSAD
accept website sample.txt. Each WF attack needs a specific information from
the captured files. For example, k-NN attack on cells needs two fields of each
captured packet which are the time of arrival and the direction of each cell. On
the other hand, OSAD attack needs only the packet size and the direction of each
captured packet. We did them all using python scripts since we have 48000 files
that contain the captured packets of every setup we used.
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5.4 Challenges
We planned to add more CRS to the selected systems, but we were unable to run
them. Tor pluggable transport obfs2 was planned to be in the set, we were able
to run it at the beginning of this work, but Tor stopped it. Tor is no longer using
this type of PT, and there are no bridges in the Tor bridges database for obfs2.
Therefore, we excluded it from the set.
StegoTorus [7] was one of the planned CRS to be included in the set. Ste-
goTorus is a CRS that is supposed to run as Tor PT, but Tor project does not
officially support it. The designers of StegoTorus provided the source code [65] to
run it with Tor. We tried to install it and run it, but it did not connect to the Ste-
goTorus bridges. They used two bridges as StegoTorus server, and we suspected
that those bridges are blocked in our region. Therefore, we tried to run StegoTorus
using a dedicated virtual machine in the cloud that is outside our ISP restrictions
by using Amazon AWS. Also, this attempt did not work, and the client software
could not connect to the server bridge. We informed the authors about this is-
sue, and even after a while, it did not work. Therefore, we excluded it from the set.
We planned to use FTE with two different setups which are FTE-TBB and
FTE-FireFox. We successfully collected traces of 97 websites using TBB. After
that, we faced a problem to connect to FTE bridges. We suspected that FTE
was blocked in our region. We tried different FTE bridges from the Tor bridges
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database. Also, we tried different versions of TBB and Tor source codes during
four months without any progress. Therefore, we used the collected samples of
FTE using TBB in our set. In the same manner, we faced some challenges when
we tried to run Tor at the beginning of this work due to the blocking of Tor in
our region. Eventually, we managed to run it.
We were able to run some CRS successfully, but they were costly in term
of collecting the traces. For example, FTE without Tor was installed and oper-
ated successfully using Amazon AWS. We used a virtual machine running Ubuntu
server as FTE server. The client machine was located in Saudi Arabia, and we
could successfully use this CRS to access blocked services. The problem was in
the costly process of collecting 4000 traces. The connection between the server
and the client was not stable for a decent period. This problem makes collecting
the data a highly time-consuming process. We used FTE without Tor in other
experiments, but we rejected it from the WF attacks.
We were able to run YourFreedom [49] successfully. This system is costly in
term of collecting the traces. Like JAP, this software comes with two type of
accounts which are free and premium. There is a limited use of the free accounts
that could not help us to use it to collect the traces of 100 websites. Therefore,





In this chapter, we discuss the statistical analysis of traffic patterns. We conduct
two classes of traffic analysis experiments. The classes are statistical analysis
and HTTP Archive format (HAR) analysis. Each class has a different setup and
required data. In every section, we discuss the goal of each experiment along with
the results of each one.
6.1 Statistical Analysis
The goal of this experiments is to see the effects and the changes that occur in
the traffic by the selected systems and defenses. In this class of experiment, we
selected eight types of statistical traffic analysis tests. Each type of them is a
traffic feature that is used in some of the WF attacks. Moreover, each one of
those features could provide us with information regarding how the censor sees
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the traffic.
The normal traffic (NT-FF) will be our base to start this analysis, and each time
we compare the changes in the traffic when we used any system.The results were
based on the captured traffic of 12 types of systems (11 CRSs and normal traffic).
As we mentioned before, with each system, we visited 100 websites with 40 visits
for each. The eight statistical traffic analysis tests are:
1. Total number of packets.
2. Total number of Incoming packets.
3. Total number of outgoing packets.
4. Average packet size.
5. Time overhead
6. Data overhead
7. Incoming unique packet lengths
8. Outgoing unique packet lengths
For each experiment, we present the results as a percentage of change according
to normal traffic. This will help us to understand how each system change the
traffic from the normal when we apply it. Moreover, we conducted the tests to see
the effect of each defense on the traffic with or without CRS. Each column in the
following experiments figures is the average result of processing 4000 samples using
a particular system. After the review of the following results, each CRS system
developers will see the effect when they include such defenses. Therefore, they
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Figure 6.1: The average and the standard deviation of the total number of packets
Figure 6.2: Percentage-of change in the total number of packets
can find the appropriate balance between applying any defense with the overhead
that comes with it.
6.1.1 Total Number of Packets
• The Total Number of Packets Per CRS: In figure 6.1 we show the re-
sults of analyzing the total number of packets per CRS. In x-axis, we present
each system selected, while in y-axis we show the average value of the total
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number of packets. The average value means that how many packets needed
on average to request a webpage with each system. With each column, we
added the value of the standard deviation on the positive side only. The
reason for that is to limit the standard deviation to the positive side of the
plot. The standard deviation will provide us with the distribution of values
around the averages. In our results, all the values are positive, but for some
CRS the standard deviation value is higher than the average.
In figure 6.1 we sort them from the minimum to the maximum based on
the average value. The CRS with lower values means that it manages to
complete the transaction using fewer packets. The lowest value is for NT-
FF which is without any CRS. In NT-FF, the packet size is larger than any
CRS which will help to end the transaction faster. The next is JAP-FF as
the lowest value among all the CRS in this experiment. On the other hand,
SS-TBB comes last with the highest value which is around 2000 packets.
• The Total Number of Packets for all CRS and Defenses: The results
of this experiment are in figure 6.2. In x-axis, we present each type of
defense, while in y-axis we show the percentage of change based on the
normal traffic. The percentage of change show how much packets added to
the traffic. For each type of defenses, the result of normal traffic without any
CRS is in the first column of each set of columns. The first column in each
set of columns represent the pure effect of each defense on the normal traffic.
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The highest values presented for normal traffic are with two defenses BuFLO
(1153%) and Decoy pages (319%). This means that we get 1153% more
packets if we apply BuFLO without any CRS. Obviously, this percentage
will be more if we applied the same defenses to any CRS. The results were
expected since both defenses techniques depend heavily on injecting new
packets into the traffic. Therefore, injecting more packets will increase the
number of total packets for each transaction. Although those defenses give
high values, but this change in the traffic will add more defense against WF
attacks as we see in the next section. The highest value is 2673% which is
the result of applying obfs4-FF with BuFLO. The lowest results are when we
apply the HTTPOS defense, specifically Tor-FF and JAP-FF with HTTPOS
defense with around 70%. For attacks that depend on traces features such
as kNN, applying such defense that produces noticeable changes will be as
an advantage for the defense. However, this will be an overhead that will
affect the performance of any system.
6.1.2 Total Number of Incoming and Outgoing Packets
The results of this experiments are in figures 6.3 and 6.4. This experiment is more
specific than the old one in which we count both incoming and outgoing packets.
This type of experiment provide us with the information about the direction
of packets for each system. Also, the results illustrate which direction is more
important to the defense. By comparing the two results, we can see that decoy
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Figure 6.3: Percentage of change in total number of Incoming packets
pages defense and Tamaraw are focusing on injecting more incoming packets. In
the other hand, BuFLO is doing the injection heavily in both directions a thousand
times more than the normal traffic. For traffic without CRS we can see that using
decoy pages defense increase the number of incoming packets by more than 300%,
and 700% in BuFLO.
The number of incoming and outgoing packets are features that interest some
of the WF attacks. By applying the machine learning in the training sets, the
attacks could identify the patterns of those features per website. So, the WF
defenses will work hard to change those patterns by injecting more junk packets
in both directions. This action add more overhead to the traffic which we see in
the data overhead experiments.
6.1.3 Average Packet Size
• Average Packet Size Per CRS: The results of this experiment are in
figure 6.5. This experiment show the average packet size when we request
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Figure 6.4: Percentage of change in total number of outgoing packets
Figure 6.5: The average and the standard deviation of packet size
Figure 6.6: Percentage of change of the average packet size
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a webpage with each system. We recall the previous results of the total
number of packets experiment. If we get a lower number of packets with
higher packet sizes, then this means the system will request the webpage
faster. This is the case of NT-FF with the highest value of average packet
size with few packets. On the other hand, notice that obfs4 is the second
highest value of packet size. In addition to that, obfs4 is also the second
highest value on the total number of packets experiment. As a result, obfs4
will request a webpage using large packet sizes with more number of packets
which means more data overhead. This conclusion will be confirmed in the
data overhead experiment.
• Average Packet Size for all CRS and Defenses: The results of this
experiment are in figure 6.6. In this experiment, we can see the values
in positive and negative sides. The reason for such results is that some
systems produce packets with sizes that are less than the normal traffic.
Since we used the normal traffic as our base, we notice that the normal
traffic shipped the packets with the largest size available once the data is
ready. Unlike CRSs, which they used fixed size packets or packets that are
less than the maximum allowed size. Therefore, the results of average packet
sizes are less than the normal traffic as shown in the figure. On the other
hand, the defenses are all based on slicing or padding techniques which will
change the average packet size of the normal traffic or any CRS traffic that
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Figure 6.7: The average and the standard deviation of time overhead
apply them. For example, BuFLO source code uses fixed size packets. We
selected the 300 bytes for performance reasons instead of 1500 bytes. On
the other hand, Tamaraw fixes the packet sizes of all packets to 800 bytes.
Both defenses will produce a percentage that is less than the normal traffic
even with using different CRS. Also, we can see that both defenses show
the columns as equal. That is because all the traces regardless of the CRS
type, will have fixed size packets. We can also see that decoy pages defense
produced less values even if we used different CRS. That is because decoy
pages will inject a lot of small packets that are imported from decoy samples
which will change the total average.
6.1.4 Time Overhead
In this experiment, we studied the time overhead caused by different CRS and
defenses as in figures 6.7 and 6.8. The goal of this experment is to find out the
time required for each CRS to request a webpage on average. We have to men-
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Figure 6.8: Percentage of change in Time overhead
tion here that for such experiment we should be as fair as possible. So, for Tor
PT we fixed the bridge’s address for all the collected samples. Furthermore, we
collected the samples of all CRS at different time periods. The collected samples
contain different types of websites from the top 100 websites of alexa’s list. As we
mentioned before, we have 4000 samples per CRS which are the result of visiting
100 web pages, and with 40 visits per each one. Moreover, Some of those websites
contained more contents than others.
• Time Overhead Per CRS: As in figure 6.7, we sorted the systems based
on the lowest average value, in other words, from the fastest to the slowest.
At the x-axis, we can see the different systems, and the y-axis shows the
average value in seconds.
The lowest value is for NT-FF with around 20 seconds. So, if the user re-
quests a webpage without using any CRS, then it will take around 20 seconds
on average. This value is considered to be high for people with high-speed
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fiber optic connections, or when requesting a lite web page. Regardless of
all that, the environment used in our experiment and the collected websites
will produce such results. For the selected CRS, Tor-TBB comes first as the
fastest CRS and followed by JAP-FF. For Tor-PT, the results are higher
which means more time overhead to the connection. This overhead is due
to the extra router and data processing for the PT-bridge before entering
the Tor network.
• Time Overhead for all CRS and Defenses: In this experiment, we
studied the time overhead caused by different CRS and defenses as in figure
6.8. The results are the percentage of change added to the traffic based
on the NT-FF. The first set of columns represent the time overhead added
to the normal traffic when we used each CRS without any defenses. The
lowest value of time overhead in this set is 52% with Tor-TBB without any
defenses. The lowest value for Tor PTs are 120% for obfs4-FF and 156%
for obfs3-FF. This means that fetching the pages with Tor PTs will take
twice the time of fetching the same pages without any CRS or defenses.
The highest value is 816% for SS-TBB with BuFLO defense. The reason
for this is that each defense will inject more packets into the original traffic.
This injection and packet manipulation will be added to the time overhead.
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6.1.5 Data Overhead
• Data Overhead Per CRS: This experiment is about the average amount
of data (Kbytes) exchanged when a user requests a webpage. So, less data
exchanged means less data overhead. As in figure 6.9, we sorted the systems
based on the lowest average value. Based on the previous experiments, the
total number of packets for NT-FF was the lowest. In addition to that,
the average packet size in NT-FF was the highest. In this experiment, the
data overhead in NT-FF is the lowest value. On the other hand, the total
number of packets and the packet size were high in obfs4-FF which mean
more data overhead. This result indicates that obfs4-FF is using a lot of big
size packets for the same webpage. Hence, the relation between the packet
size and the number of packets will affect the data overhead. Finally, we
should mention here that this overhead of obfs4 will play a significant role
to resist the WF attacks.
• Data Overhead for all CRS and Defenses: To compare all the selected
CRS regarding the data overhead, we can focus on the first set of columns
in figure 6.10. JAP-FF comes first as the lowest value with 28% overhead
added to the normal traffic followed by Tor-FF with 44%. We can focus
on one system for example, on Tor-TBB in figure 6.10, we can see that
the best results are 63% data overhead with no defense and 77% when we
apply the HTTPOS defense on Tor-TBB. Among all defenses, HTTPOS
show lower results, These results show that even if HTTPOS expand only
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Figure 6.9: The average and the standard deviation of the data overhead
Figure 6.10: Percentage of change in data overhead
the outgoing packets to MTU, it will balance the overhead with the slicing
of the incoming packets. The highest values are when we apply BuFLO
defense, and it produces at least 100% data overhead.
6.1.6 Unique Packet Lengths
This statistical analysis feature is based on counting the appearance of packet
sizes between 1 and 1500 which is the MTU. For example, if all the packets in
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Figure 6.11: Percentage of change in Incoming unique packet lengths
the traffic are with size 1500, then the value of the unique packet lengths is 1.
On the other hand, if the unique packet lengths equal 5, then the packet sizes
of that traffic will have five different values between 1 and 1500. By comparing
figure 6.11 and 6.12, we can see that samples of traffic without defenses, decoy
pages, and HTTPOS are same in case of incoming unique packet lengths. This
similarity is due to the different amount of packet sizes in the incoming traffic. In
particular, the traffic samples have incoming unique packet lengths of 1495. The
result in the outgoing unique packet lengths of HTTPOS, BuFLO, and Tammarw
are same due to the fixed packet size which 1. For HTTPOS, it will fix the size
of outgoing packets to 1500. For BuFLO, all the packets are with the size 300.
Also, Tammarw fixes all the packet sizes to 800.
6.1.7 Experiment Summary
Based on all the results, we ranked the selected systems and defenses in tables 6.1
and 6.2. The first table 6.1 is divided into three parts which are time overhead,
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Figure 6.12: Percentage of change in outgoing unique packet lengths
data overhead and the number of packets. In each part, we ranked the systems
from the lowest to the highest. For example, NT-FF comes in the first place be-
cause it provided the smallest values in time overhead, data overhead, and less
number of packets. In the second table 6.2, we ranked the defenses based on the
results from the lowest to the highest at the same way.
From table 6.2, we can see that HTTPOS is ranked in the first place. HTTPOS
produces less data overhead and less number of packets. Those results show that
HTTPOS is a lightweight defense. On the other hand, Decoy pages and Tamaraw
show acceptable overhead results in the third and fourth places. As we mentioned
before, the WF defenses are applied to reduce the damage of WF attacks. So, if
any CRS developer wants to apply WF defenses, they should consider the over-
head and the resistance to WF attacks. We see in the next chapter the results of
all those CRS and defenses with the WF attacks.
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Statistical Analysis Summary
Time overhead Data Overhead Number of Packets
# CRS CRS Class CRS CRS Class CRS CRS Class
1 NT-FF - NT-FF - NT-FF -
2 Tor-TBB Proxy JAP-FF Proxy JAP-FF Proxy
3 JAP-FF Proxy Tor-FF Proxy Tor-FF Proxy
4 Tor-FF Proxy meek-FF DR FTE-TBB PRGM
5 obfs4-FF RND FTE-TBB PRGM meek-FF DR
6 obfs3-FF RND obfs3-TBB RND obfs3-TBB RND
7 SS-FF RND Tor-TBB Proxy obfs3-FF RND
8 FTE-TBB PRGM obfs3-FF RND Tor-TBB Proxy
9 obfs4-TBB RND obfs4-TBB RND SS-FF RND
10 obfs3-TBB RND SS-TBB RND obfs4-TBB RND
11 meek-FF DR SS-FF RND obfs4-FF RND
12 SS-TBB RND obfs4-FF RND SS-TBB RND
Table 6.1: Statistical Analysis Summary, (RND) for Randomization, (PRGM) for
Programmable and (DR) for Decoy Routing
Statistical Analysis Summary (Defenses)
Data Overhead Number of Packets
# Defense Class Defense Class
1 HTTPOS Limited HTTPOS Limited
2 Decoy pages Limited Traffic morphing Limited
3 Tamaraw General Tamaraw General
4 Traffic morphing Limited Decoy pages Limited
5 BuFLO General BuFLO General
Table 6.2: Statistical Analysis Summary for defenses
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6.2 HTTP Archive Format Analysis
In each webpage, there are several objects such as images, scripts and cascading
style sheets. When a user requests a webpage, the browser will communicate with
the server to fetch all objects. The goal of such experiments is to see the impact
of each selected CRS on the browser’s behavior. To study the webpage fetching
process, we analyze the HTTP Archive (HAR) file [70]. It is a JSON-formatted
file generated by the browser that contains information about all objects in a sin-
gle request.
6.2.1 Browsers and Webpage Objects
When the browser fetches an object in a webpage, then the process go through
four phases. Those phases are scheduling, connecting, sending, waiting and re-
ceiving. Each stage takes a period of time, usually milliseconds. The first phase is
scheduling phase, which measures the time spent for an object in a queue waiting
for network connection. The second phase is connecting phase, which measures
the time taken for an object to create a TCP connection. The third phase is send-
ing phase, which is the time taken for sending the HTTP request to the server.
The fourth phase is the waiting phase, which is the waiting time for the response
that is coming from the server. The fifth phase is receiving phase, which measures
the time for reading the whole response from the server.
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To prepare for this experiment, we need to select a webpage target, CRS, browser
type and datasets to process. We selected the Wikipedia home page as a webpage
target. Then we deploy each CRS selected in our set, and request our targeted
webpage. For the browser type, we selected Firefox and TBB, and they are both
supporting the HAR files. For each request, we need to get the HAR file that is
generated by the browser. The HAR file is a JSON-formatted file generated by
the browser that includes information about each requested object.
We used the same machine and browsers versions as in 5.2. The data collection
process starts by deploying the CRS, then open the browser without any saved
caches or history files. After that, we request the targeted page and wait until the
page is entirely loaded. Then, we can extract the HAR file from the browser. At
that point, our dataset is a set of HAR files, and each file will hold the information
about a visit to Wikipedia home page. We developed our python scripts that will
extract the information from the HAR files and represent them as plots.
6.2.3 Experment Results
We conducted two experiments based on HAR files. The first one was comparing
eight types of requests to Wikipedia homepage. The second experiment was com-
paring the same request using different Tor PT-bridges using Firefox and TBB.
For the first experiment, we selected eight types of requests to Wikipedia home-
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page as following
1. Normal traffic without CRS using Firefox (NT-FF).
2. Tor only using TBB (Tor-TBB).
3. Tor with obfs3 using TBB (obfs3-TBB).
4. Tor with obfs4 using TBB (obfs4-TBB).
5. Tor with ScrambleSuit using TBB (SS-TBB)
6. Tor with meek using TBB (meek-TBB)
7. JAP using Firefox (JAP-FF).
8. Your Freedom using Firefox (YourFreedom-FF).
Wikipedia homepage at the time of this experiment has 27 objects. Those objects
are one HTML page, two css, five javascript, 16 PNG and 3 JPG objects. As illus-
trated in figure 6.13, we can clearly see that using Firefox in three types of request
are almost the same compared to other requests. On the other hand, the requests
done by using TBB are more different and random. The TBB is the browser used
by Tor which is a modified browser based on Firefox Extended Support Release
(ESR). To investigate this results more, we conducted the second experiment.
In the second experiment, we fixed the same Tor PT-bridges and requested the
same page using Firefox and TBB. As illustrated in figure 6.14, the results show
that even using the same bridges but with various types of the same browser we
get different results. To understand those results we have to study the browser
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used by Tor which is TBB.
Tor project team edited Firefox browser to make it more resistant to traffic
analysis attacks. They changed the preferences by applying two features which
are HTTP pipelining and randomizing number of requests [36]. HTTP pipelining
as in figure 3.5 means that the client will be allowed to make multiple requests
without waiting for each response [71]. As we mentioned in chapter 3.2.1, request
randomization means that in each request the number of concurrently fetched
objects will vary. This feature will avoid having any patterns while requesting
the web page objects. Moreover, such feature will produce different patterns for
the same request each time. Tor project team applied this feature by configuring
Firefox preferences (network.http.pipelining.X) to true, while the randomization
is achieved by a patch. On the other hand, Firefox removed this feature from the





We conducted 321 experiments regarding WF attacks using three major attacks
Wa-kNN, Wa-OSAD and Cai-OSAD. We applied the attacks on 12 different types
of traces independently. For collecting samples phase, we used the same environ-
ment setup mentioned in section 5.2. After collecting all the samples, we per-
formed a cleaning phase as required by each type of the attacks to prepare the
traces. The plan is to perform the attacks on the traces without any defenses.
Then, conducting the same attacks again after applying different types of defenses




For Wa-kNN attack, there are three types of traces which are cells, time and
packet size, packet size only. Wa-kNN attacks are targeting Tor traffic, and the
best results come when the traces are in the form of cells. We conducted the
other Wa-kNN attacks with different traces to see the result of changing the type
of traces. For each set of traces that were collected using the same CRS, we
conducted six types of experiments on cells as following:
1. Wa-kNN attack without any defense.
2. Wa-kNN with Decoy pages defense.
3. Wa-kNN with Traffic Morphing defense.
4. Wa-kNN with HTTPOS split defense.
5. Wa-kNN with BuFLO defense.
6. Wa-kNN with Tamaraw defense.
The accuracy results in Wa-kNN attack is between 0 and 1. For example, if we
get a result of 0.90 that means Wa-kNN recognized 90% of the traces. Moreover,
each attack will produce a result of five accuracies. The final result presented for
each experiment is the average value of those five accuracies. To perform all types
of Wa-kNN experiments, we selected 100 websites with 40 traces for each.
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Figure 7.1: kNN attack and defenses on cell
7.1.1 Wa-kNN using Cells
When we configured k-NN to analyze traces as cells, then that means we did not
include the packet size in the traces. The information about each packet will be
the time of arrival and the direction of each cell. The dataset preparation pro-
cess will include only the packets that carry the data. As suggested by all the
researcher, we have to ignore all the packets that are not important such as ACK,
SYN, RST or FIN. This kind of packets are considered as noise, and we only focus
on packets that carry the data which will be in packets of flag PSH. Moreover,
each packet with PSH flag will be rounded down to the nearest multiple of 512
which give us how many cells shipped inside that packet. In the end, we will
represent the trace as a series of time and cell direction.
As illustrated in figure 7.1, results of traces collected using Tor-TBB and Tor-
FF without any defense are the highest values among all systems. This result
means that the attack could recognize around 82% of the traces. For Tor PT-
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bridges, SS-FF and obfs4-FF have the lowest results with less than 50%, which
means they are more resistance to this attack.
In the second set of columns, we show the results after applying Decoy pages
defense. Clearly, we can see the effect of that defense that minimize the results
to less than 12% for all systems. This result demonstrates that applying this de-
fense by injecting new packets as a decoy packets will make those systems more
resistance to such attack.
The third and fourth sets of columns illustrate two different defenses that are
nearly similar to each other which are Traffic morphing and HTTPOS. Both de-
fenses produced results with less than 10% from the traces without defense. The
results indicate that the defenses are not adding any noticeable resistance to this
attack.
The fifth and sixth set of columns show better results beside decoy pages
defense. BuFLO and Tamaraw defenses manage to make the attack recognize less
than 20% in all the systems. This results will rank those two defenses as better
defenses with decoy pages. The best results are the lowest which are 4% for both
Tor-TBB and obfs3-TBB with Tamaraw defense.
107
Figure 7.2: kNN attack and defenses on traces as time and packet size
7.1.2 Wa-kNN using Time and Packet Size
The traces of this part of the experiment contain the time of arrival and packet size
with the direction of each packet. This type of experiments is new, and we tried
to test how the attack will act when receiving a different kind of traces. Although
Wa-kNN is mainly targeting Tor traffic, we did include NT-FF and JAP-FF to
see how it will work. This action will add more information, but the results of
this attack will be different. We included NT-FF and JAP-FF and conducted the
following experiments:
1. Wa-kNN attack without any defense.
2. Wa-kNN with 1000 open world traces added.
3. Wa-kNN with Decoy pages and 1000 Open world traces (DecoyPages+OW).
4. Wa-kNN with Decoy pages defense.
5. Wa-kNN with Traffic Morphing defense.
6. Wa-kNN with HTTPOS split defense.
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7. Wa-kNN with BuFLO defense.
8. Wa-kNN with Tamaraw defense.
As illustrated in figure 7.2 the attack succeed to recognize more than 80% of
three types of traces which are traces without CRS, FTE-TBB, and JAP. On the
other hand, the attack managed to recognize around 35% of two types of traces
which are obfs4-TBB and ScrambleSuit-TBB. Based on that, we can consider
them as systems that are capable of resisting this type of attack. In the second
set of columns, adding 1000 open world traces did not affect the results to resist
the attack.
The third and fourth sets of columns show the results after applying Decoy
pages defense. Clearly, we can see the effect of that defense that minimize the
results to less than 25% for all systems except traces without CRS and JAP.
The attack could recognize around 15% of obs3-FF and ScrambleSuit-TBB which
make them more resistance to this attack using that defense.
The fifth and sixth sets of columns illustrate two defenses which are Traffic
Morphing and HTTPOS. Traffic Morphing managed to minimize the impact of
the attack to recognize around 50% of the traces except for traces without CRS
and JAP. While in HTTPOS, the attack could recognize more than 80% of FTE-
TBB as if there is no defense.
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Figure 7.3: kNN attack and defenses on traces as packet size
The seventh set of columns show the best results among all defenses. Tamaraw
defense managed to make the attack recognize around 10% in all the systems. This
results will rank this defense as the best defense in all the experiments.
7.1.3 Wa-kNN using Packet Size
Traces used in this experiment will contain only packet sizes and the direction of
each packet. As illustrated in figure 7.3, the first and second sets of columns show
similar results to the previous experiment. After applying Decoy pages defense,
the attack managed to recognize around 20% of the traces except for traffic with-
out CRS, FTE-TBB, and JAP. These results indicate that Decoy pages defense
is more resistance when the traces consist of packet size only.
Traffic Morphing and HTTPOS in the fifth and sixth sets of columns show
better results than the previous experiment, but still higher than other defenses.
As in all experiments, BuFLO and Tamaraw defenses in the seventh and eighth
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set of columns managed to resist the attack to recognize less than 19% of the
traces.
As a summary of Wa-kNN attacks, making the traces as cells will produce
higher results than other experiments. The higher results mean that the attack
could recognize more traces. On the other hand, traces like normal traffic and
JAP will not produce realistic results since they do not use cells as Tor. For the
defenses, applying Decoy pages, BuFLO and Tamaraw defenses will be best option
to resist this type of attack.
7.2 Wa-OSAD and Cai-OSAD
For Wa-OSAD and Cai-OSAD, the traces are rounded packet size. Moreover, we
did not include any open world traces because both attacks are supporting only
closed world traces. For Wa-OSAD we conducted five types of experiments as
following:
1. Wa-OSAD attack without any defense.
2. Wa-OSAD with Decoy pages defense.
3. Wa-OSAD with Traffic Morphing defense.
4. Wa-OSAD with HTTPOS split defense.
5. Wa-OSAD with Tamaraw defense.
For Cai-OSAD we conducted 3 types of experiments as following
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1. Cai-OSAD attack without any defense.
2. Cai-OSAD with Traffic Morphing defense.
3. Cai-OSAD with HTTPOS split defense.
The accuracy results in Wa-OSAD and Cai-OSAD attacks are between 0%
and 100%. Each Wa-OSAD attack will produce a result of 10 accuracies. On
the hand, Cai-OSAD will produce a result of 5 accuracies. In the end, the final
result presented for each experiment is the average value of those accuracies. To
perform Wa-OSAD and Cai-OSAD experiments, we selected 25 websites with 40
traces for each.
7.2.1 Wa-OSAD using Rounded Packet Size
Figure 7.4 illustrates the results of Wa-OSAD attack with different types of de-
fenses. The first set of columns represent the attack without any defense. The
highest value is 93% for traces of NT-FF and 89% for JAP-FF. For Tor and Tor
PTs, the highest result is 87% for Tor-TBB followed by 75% for obfs3-TBB. The
lowest result is when we used SS-FF and obfs4-TBB with 44%.
The second set of columns represent the attack with Decoy pages defense. The
highest value is 55% for FTE-TBB followed by 51% for traces without using CRS.
In general, The Decoy pages defense reduced the effect of the attack by around
30% in all system.
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Figure 7.4: Wa-OSAD attacks and defenses on traces as rounded packet size
The third set of columns are the results of Traffic morphing defense. The
highest value is 70% for traces without CRS followed by 62% for JAP. The lowest
value is 40% for meek-FF, means that the defense managed to reduce the effect
of the attack by 24%.
The fourth set of columns represent the attack with HTTPOS defense. In
general, the result of this defense is below Traffic morphing by around 10%. Com-
pared to the attack without defense, we can see that this defense reduced the
impact of the attack by a value between 40% to 50% in all systems.
The fifth set of columns represent the attack with Tamaraw defense. The
highest value is 57% when we use ScrambleSuit-TBB, where the lowest value is
28% for obfs3-TBB. Tamaraw defense showed good results to resist the attack, but
not as good as the results of the Wa-kNN attack at the previous experiments. In
the end, we can mention that Decoy pages and Tamaraw are the suitable defenses
for this attack.
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Figure 7.5: Cai-OSAD attacks and defenses on traces as rounded packet size
7.2.2 Cai-OSAD using Rounded Packet Size
The results for Cai-OSAD attacks represented as percentages from 0% to 100%.
As illustrated in figure 7.5, the first set of columns represent the attack without
any defense. The highest value is 94% for the traffic without any CRS and 91%
for JAP-FF and obfs3-TBB. Next, there are 3 CRSs with results that are above
or equal 85% which are FTE-TBB, Tor-TBB, and SS-TBB. The lowest value is
64% for SS-FF and obfs4-FF, which means that Cai-OSAD recognized more than
half of the traces.
The second set of columns represent the attack with Traffic morphing defense.
Traffic without CRS and Tor-TBB get the highest values with 85% followed by
obfs3-TBB with 80%. The lowest value is 52% for obfs3-FF which is interesting
because we used the same settings but with a different browser. The missing bar
is for ScrambleSuit-FF, we tried the experiment with different environments more
than four times, but each time we faced an error that stopped the experiment.
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The third set of columns represent the attack with HTTPOS defense. Clearly,
we can see that the defense did not succeed to reduce the effect of the attack.
The results for all the system are similar to the result of the attack without any
defense with around 2% less.
7.3 Number of Samples versus Accuracy
We should mention that the results of all the experiments could vary based on
the selected samples. For example, if we selected more traces for each site (more
than 40 traces per site) we will get higher results. Also, the training set for each
experiment will affect the results, for Wa-kNN we selected 36 traces out of 40 for
distance learning and four traces for testing. For Cai-OSAD the training set is 36
traces out of 40, and all the attacks applied 10-fold cross-validation.
All those variables will affect in some ways the results of the experiment. In
figure 7.6 we demonstrated how Wa-kNN attack changed the accuracy based on
the included samples. In that experiment, we fixed the number of websites to 100
and changed the number of samples with each attack. We can notice that the ac-
curacy increased when we increment the number of samples. The reason for such
changes is because that the training phase we include more samples. Therefore,
the attack will have more information about the samples. Moreover, the chance

































Figure 7.6: the accuracy of Wa-kNN attack versus number of samples
In figure 7.7, we demonstrate how the changing of the number of samples could
produce different results for Cai-OSAD. We conduct this small experiment with
ten websites and 15 traces for each. The results of the experiment are higher than
the previous experiments. The set is tiny, and the chance to recognize that set is
higher.
7.4 Experiment Conclusion
In the tables 7.1 and 7.2 we summarised the results of the WF attacks and de-
fenses. In table 7.1, we ranked all the CRS used from the most resistance to the
least resistance. As we can see, ScrambleSuit and obfs4 are the most resistance
systems to WF attacks. Those two systems produced more overhead results in
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Figure 7.7: Cai-OSAD attacks on traces as rounded packet size with 10 websites
15 traces for each
the statistical analysis experiments of the previous chapter. So, the developers of
those systems can tolerate the overhead if they want to reduce the damage of WF
attacks. In fact, the overhead will be increased when they apply WF defenses on
to on their systems.
In the table 7.2, we ranked the defenses from the most resistance to the least
resistance. Tamaraw comes first as the best defense to resist WF attacks. Decoy
pages defense comes in the second place as a good defense. Both defenses pro-
duced acceptable overhead results in the statistical analysis experiments of the
previous chapter. As a recommendation, we suggest that applying those defenses
will provide good resistance to WF attacks with acceptable overhead.
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Website Fingerprinting Attacks versus all CRS
Wa-kNN Cai-OSAD Wa-OSAD
# CRS CRS class CRS CRS class CRS CRS class
1 SS-FF RND SS-FF RND SS-FF RND
2 obfs4-FF RND obfs4-FF RND obfs4-TBB RND
3 obfs3-FF RND obfs3-FF RND obfs4-FF RND
4 SS-TBB RND meek-FF DR SS-TBB RND
5 meek-FF DR Tor-FF Proxy obfs3-FF RND
6 obfs4-TBB RND obfs4-TBB RND meek-FF DR
7 obfs3-TBB RND Tor-TBB Proxy FTE-TBB PRGM
8 FTE-TBB PRGM SS-TBB RND obfs3-TBB RND
9 Tor-FF Proxy FTE-TBB PRGM Tor-FF Proxy
10 Tor-TBB Proxy JAP-FF Proxy Tor-TBB Proxy
11 obfs3-TBB RND JAP-FF Proxy
12 NT-FF - NT-FF -
Table 7.1: The resistance to website fingerprinting, summary of all CRS, (RND)
for Randomization, (PRGM) for Programmable and (DR) for Decoy Routing
Resistance to Website Fingerprinting Attacks (Defenses)
Wa-kNN OSAD
# Defense class Defense class
1 Tamaraw General Tamaraw General
2 Decoy pages Limited Decoy pages Limited
3 BuFLO General HTTPOS Limited
4 Traffic morphing Limited Traffic morphing Limited
5 HTTPOS Limited -





In this chapter, we summarize the work of this thesis. Moreover, we discuss the
important results and their indications. In addition to that, we present some
recommendations to both users and developers of censorship resistance systems
based on our results. Then we discuss some of the limitation and validity threats
we faced during work. In the end, we introduce some outlines for the future
work regarding censorship resistance systems, website fingerprinting attacks and
defenses.
8.1 Conclusion
In this thesis, we selected a set of 8 well-known and heavily used censorship re-
sistance systems. We analyzed those systems empirically with more than 800
experiments. Those experiments were divided into two main classes which are the
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statistical analysis of traffic patterns and the resistance to website fingerprinting
attacks.
For the first class of experiments, we studied the patterns appeared on the
traffic for each selected CRS. Moreover, we extended the study to include five
popular website fingerprinting defenses. For all the selected systems and defenses,
we analyzed the changes that occurred inside the traffic. As a result of those ex-
periments, we evaluated the selected systems based on the time and data overhead.
In case of time overhead, we found that proxy class CRS such as Tor and JAP
produced less time overhead results. This conclusion means that such systems are
faster than other CRS regarding web browsing. Such results are because of the
less data processing involved in proxy class CRS. Also, we found that Tor plug-
gable transports gave more time overhead results. Those results were expected
because Tor-PTs are applied on top of Tor.
In case of data overhead, we found that proxy class CRS produced less data
overhead on the traffic. The packets generated by those systems are less with
larger sizes. This process will allow carrying a large piece of data in fewer trans-
actions. On the other hand, the packets generated by Tor-PTs are more with
larger sizes which will add more data overhead.
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For WF defenses, the developers depend on padding, slicing and time delay
techniques to change the traffic shape. Such experiments will help the decision
makers to select the proper defense to balance between overhead and resistance
to WF attacks. We ranked the WF defenses based on the added data overhead
to the traffic. HTTPOS was in the first place as a lightweight defense with less
data overhead. Followed by Decoy pages and Tamaraw with acceptable results
regarding data overhead. Then, Traffic morphing and BuFLO at the end of the
list with more data overhead due to the massive amount of data injection.
We tested the impact of the browser type used by each CRS to see if there
are any defenses applied. We found that TBB applied two types of defenses on
the browser level. Such defenses on that level will change any patterns about
requesting the objects inside a webpage. We found that TBB requests a set of
objects at once with a pipelining method. Moreover, TBB will change the size of
that set randomly in each request. Such action will produce a new pattern with
each request from the same webpage. This defense is called pipelining and request
randomization. We found that this defense was implemented only in TBB using
patches.
For the second class of experiments, we examined the impact of website fin-
gerprinting attacks on the selected systems and defenses. We conducted more
than 300 attacks to test the resistance of each CRS with a different combination
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of all the defenses. At the end of those experiments, we evaluated the selected
systems based on the resistance to website fingerprinting attacks. In addition to
that, we ranked the defenses based on the effect of reducing the damage of website
fingerprinting attacks.
For WF attacks, we found that the systems in the randomization class were
the most resistance CRSs against all the attacks. Such systems are depending on
changing the traffic completely by applying encryption methods. Those systems
will remove any traffic features used by the classifiers of Wa-kNN, Wa-OSAD, and
Cai-OSAD attacks. On the other hand, we found that proxy class systems were
the least resistance CRS to such attacks.
For WF defenses, we found that Tamaraw, BuFLO and Decoy pages are the
top defenses that reduced the damage of WF attacks. On the other hand, we
found that the lightweight HTTPOS defense was at the end of the list after Traf-
fic morphing. Our results provide a guideline for the developers of any CRS in
case they decided to apply one of the defenses.
As a result of all the experiments combined, we proposed a list of recommen-
dations for CRS developers and users. First, we recommended the Tor users to
use TBB while accessing Tor network. We explained that TBB applied different
defenses against traffic patterns fingerprinting such as request randomization and
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pipelining. Second, we recommend Tor users to use Tor Pluggable Transports
instead of Tor only. Tor Pluggable Transports applied more advanced techniques
to bypass censorship and resist website fingerprinting attacks.
Based on our results we proposed several recommendations for CRS develop-
ers. First, we noticed that the CRSs in the randomization class produced more
overhead than other systems. On the other hand, those systems showed good
results regarding the resistance of website fingerprinting attacks. Therefore, the
developers of those systems should decide the selected website fingerprinting de-
fense carefully. Such a decision will avoid unnecessary overhead to a good system.
Second, we showed that HTTPOS defense is a lightweight defense but with less re-
sistance to website fingerprinting attacks. On the contrary, BuFLO is heavyweight
defense with more resistance to website fingerprinting attacks. While Decoy pages
and Tamaraw showed an acceptable results in both overhead and attacks resis-
tance. Therefore, those two defenses are a proper choice to balance the overhead
with the security.
8.2 Threats to Validity
In this section, we mention some of the limitations we faced in our work. More-
over, we discuss some situations that could affect the validity of our work.
There are some limitations regarding the censorship research. As an example,
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the lack of information about the real world equipment and specifications. We
tried to obtain some information from local corporations about the type of equip-
ment used by them. Such information is considered as secret and can’t be shared
for security reasons.
Also, There are some limitations regarding the censorship resistance systems.
For example, the ability to change the CRS server-side settings. Mainly, the
server-side application is controlled by the team of each CRS. For example, if we
can get access to Tor bridges or Tor entry node, then we try to apply a different
mix of Tor-PTs. Moreover, we can apply the WF defenses on the Tor bridge to
test how it will work in such network. It is possible to set up a local Tor network
and test it, but the results will not be realistic.
Another limitation regarding the censorship resistance systems was the lack
of information for the commercial application. Some closed applications like
YourFreedom did not publish the exact mechanism about how it work. At that
point, we only depend on some essential information and the network forensics on
the traffic generated by such systems.
The results of WF attacks could vary based on the setup of each experiment
as we showed in the last chapter. However, sometimes the results could be consid-
ered as not valid. The rejection will happen if the results are far from the results
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found in similar works. The reasons for such invalid results could be an unclean
dataset, wrong setup or different parameters in the source code of the attack.
For example, Wa-kNN was applied only on Tor dataset, and there are no tests
regarding Tor-PTs. To find valid results for Tor-PTs, we need to test our Tor
dataset first. If we could produce similar results to others, then we are in the
right direction. We rejected one dataset of Tor with 4000 samples and recollected
again. The dataset was mixed with irrelevant data and added some noise to the
samples.
8.3 Future Work
In this thesis, we selected eight censorship resistance systems used nowadays. This
list of systems could be extended as future work to include more CRS. Further-
more, the list of web browsers used by each CRS cloud be increased to see the
changes on the browser level. Moreover, the features used to analyze the traffic
of each CRS could be extended to study more patterns.
This work can be extended to include more website fingerprinting attacks.
There are other website fingerprinting attacks [52] such as Li-NBayes, Pa-FeaturesSVM,
Wa-FLev, and others. Moreover, the designed evaluations measures of this work
can be used to compare security and overhead of a larger set of systems and at-
tacks. In addition to that, Including those attacks with more censorship resistance
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Appendix 1 : Installing Tor
all this command line are applied on ubuntu 16.04 LTS
1. download the source code from Tor project it’s tor-0.2.8.7.tar.gz
2. make sure you have two libraries
$sudo apt−get i n s t a l l l i b event−dev
$sudo apt−get i n s t a l l l i b s s l −dev
3. compile the source code run :
$sudo . / c o n f i g u r e && sudo make && sudo make i n s t a l l
Appendix 2 : Installing Tor PT
obfsproxy




$sudo apt−get i n s t a l l python−dev
$sudo apt−get python−pip
$sudo apt−get libgmp−dev bui ld−e s s e n t i a l
$pip i n s t a l l obfsproxy
obfs4proxy
To install obfs4. run the following command :
$sudo apt−get obfs4proxy
FTE
To install FTE. run the following command :
$sudo apt−get update
$sudo apt−get i n s t a l l python−dev
$sudo apt−get python−pip
$sudo apt−get libgmp−dev bui ld−e s s e n t i a l
$sudo pip i n s t a l l f t eproxy
meek
To install meek. run the following command :
$sudo apt−get i n s t a l l meek−c l i e n t
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Appendix 3 : Configuring Tor
To update your tor configuration file and adding the bridges :
$sudo ged i t / e t c / to r / t o r r c
add the following lines based on the PT selected for example , in obfs2 it will be
like :
UseBridges 1
Cl i entTransportPlug in ob f s2 exec / l o c / o f / obfsproxy −−managed
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